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THE CORE OF ANTITRUST AND THE
SLOW DEATH OF DR. MILES
Thomas C. Arthur*
"Interbrand competition ... is the primary concern of antitrust law."
-Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.
(1977) (Powell, J.)l
ROM its nineteenth century beginnings to the present, American
antitrust law has dealt with the problem of monopoly power cre-
ated by cartels, large horizontal mergers, and predatory exclusion.
At the same time it has striven, to a greater or lesser extent, not to restrict
productive cooperation among competitors, smaller mergers, or the ex-
clusion of less efficient firms by more efficient ones. Over the years, of
course, there has been much controversy over how to distinguish cartels
from productive joint ventures, too large from acceptable mergers, and
predation from superior efficiency, but all have agreed that these are ba-
sic issues. This is the core of antitrust.
At times, other economic 2 and even non-economic social and political
concerns 3 have affected antitrust law and policy: protection of small busi-
nesses from more efficient rivals, autonomy for distributors, preservation
of traditional property rights, and an antipathy toward big business, to
name the most significant. While these concerns have strongly influenced
antitrust law in certain eras, they and the legal doctrines based on them
have lacked the staying power of the core antitrust concerns that have
shaped antitrust law throughout its history. Their prime contribution to
antitrust doctrine has been to unsettle it, as the Supreme Court has bal-
anced these non-statutory concerns against core antitrust values with no
* L.Q.C. Lamar Professor, Emory University School of Law. A.B. 1968, Duke Uni-
versity; J.D. 1971, Yale Law School.
1. 433 U.S. 36, 51 n.19 (1977).
2. See Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflec-
tions on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2-5 (1977) (monopolistic competition
model); Frederick M. Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust and the Delusions of Models: The
Faustian Pact of Law and Economics, 72 GEO. L.J. 1511, 1520-23, 1541-47 (oligopoly
model).
3. See Eleanor M. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1140, 1141 (1981) ("Antitrust emerged from the 1960s as a philosophy and
body of law reflecting American democracy."). See generally Thomas E. Kauper, The
"Warren Court" and the Antitrust Laws: Of Economics, Populism, and Cynicism, 67 MICH.
L. REV. 325 (1967) (describing how Warren Court antitrust decisions emphasized preserva-
tion of economic opportunity and uncoerced, fully independent decision making without




The core of antitrust, by contrast, provides a basis for principled judi-
cial decision making in two fundamental ways. First, it confines the reach
of the antitrust statutes to the original "trust problem" that provoked
them, the problems presented by cartels, mergers to monopoly, and pre-
dation. Other issues of business regulation are outside the statutes, to be
dealt with by other regulatory regimes. They do not raise antirust issues.
Within the core of antitrust, judicial decision making is guided by the
original vices: cartels, mergers to monopoly, and predatory exclusion, and
the original countervailing virtues: cooperation in aid of production and
competitive success based on superior products, services, and prices.
While the judicial task under the core of antitrust is still daunting, it is at
least doable. Guided by core antitrust concerns, courts can produce a
more coherent, stable, and workable doctrine.
The second way is even more fundamental. Judicial decisions based on
the statutory core of antitrust are legitimate in ways the free form judicial
lawmaking outside the core can never be. If based on the original Con-
gressional choices embedded in the core of antitrust, judicial decision
making in antitrust is a traditional judicial task, rather than a quasi-legis-
lative one based on nothing more than judges' personal views of appro-
priate business regulation. This regulatory task is more appropriate for
an administrative agency or, better, Congress itself. Basing decisions on
core statutory antitrust questions and values by no means eliminates judi-
cial discretion in antitrust, but it does cabin it significantly.
In the last generation, the Supreme Court, while not expressly relying
on the core of antitrust, has been returning antitrust law to its core. In
the process, it has produced a body of doctrine that is far more internally
coherent and faithful to the original statues. The Court's decisions on
vertical restraints have been part of this return to the core of antitrust.
By themselves, resale price maintenance (RPM) and other forms of in-
trabrand distributional restraints5 are not part of the core of antitrust.
There is no reason for antitrust law to forbid these productive practices.
In some cases, however, RPM can be used by a cartel. A manufactur-
ers' cartel can require members to use RPM, to discourage members from
cheating on the cartel price. A dealers' cartel can force a manufacturer to
4. See generally Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the Con-
stitutional Sherman Act, 74 CAL. L. REV. 263 (1986) [hereinafter Arthur, Farewell]; Thomas
C. Arthur, Workable Antitrust Law: The Statutory Approach to Antitrust, 62 TUL. L. REV.
1163 (1988) [hereinafter Arthur, Workable].
5. Not all manufacturer-imposed restraints are intrabrand restraints, that is, those
which affect only intrabrand competition, which is competition among dealers of a single
brand. Interbrand distributional restraints, such as tying and exclusive dealing, prevent
purchasers from buying competing goods and present different issues, which are beyond
the scope of this Article. Distributional restraints are also known as vertical restraints
(between buyers and sellers), in contrast to horizontal restraints between competitors at
the same level of distribution, for example, manufacturers. This Article uses the terms
"restricted distribution," "vertical restraints," "intrabrand restraints" and "distributional
restraints" interchangeably to refer to the same thing: manufacturer-imposed restraints on
the wholesalers and/or distributors of its own brand.
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"impose" RPM on its members to increase their margins and protect
themselves from competition by discounters. These uses of RPM, of
course, do affect the core of antitrust and should be forbidden as part of
an effective anticartel policy.
In 1911, however, the Supreme Court held in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.
John D. Park & Sons Co. that all forms of RPM,6 whether connected to a
cartel or not, violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.7 In time, Dr. Miles
was considered to have established a per se rule against all use of RPM,
even if no cartel was involved. In 2007, the Court overruled Dr. Miles in
Leegin Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., holding that RPM must be
evaluated under the rule of reason, like all other intrabrand restraints. 8
This decision was sharply criticized in Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion9
and also by commentators 10 and politicians" as betraying basic antitrust
principles1 2 and for "its departure from ordinary considerations of stare
decisis" in overruling a precedent "upon which the legal profession, busi-
ness, and the public have relied for close to a century. '13
This harsh criticism is unfounded. As this Article will show, simple
RPM does not implicate any core antitrust concern, and RPM used in
connection with a cartel can still be forbidden under the rule of reason.
Dr. Miles's overbroad rule was based on an economic mistake and on
property law concerns unrelated to the core of antitrust. Unsupported by
core antitrust principles, Dr. Miles has not been the pillar of antitrust
doctrine described by Justice Breyer's dissent. Far from establishing a
clear cut, easily administrable bright line rule, Dr. Miles has been a source
of confusion and formalistic line drawing from its very beginning, as the
Court has permitted it to be evaded by practices which have the same
economic effect.
6. This Article will refer to RPM unconnected to any cartel as "simple RPM."
7. 220 U.S. 373, 385 (1911).
8. 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2007).
9. Id. at 2725 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg joined
this opinion. Id.
10. For representative samples, see generally, Mark D. Bauer, Whither Dr. Miles?, 20
LOYOLA CONSUMER L. REV. 1 (2007); Richard M. Brunell, Overruling Dr. Miles: The Su-
preme Trade Commission in Action, 52 ANTITRUST BULL. 475 (2007); Marina Lao, Leegin
and Resale Price Maintenance-A Model for Emulation or for Caution for the World?, 39
INT'L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 253 (2008). Other commentators have
praised the majority's decision, of course. See, e.g., Daniel J. Gifford & E. Thomas Sulli-
van, The Roberts Antitrust Court: A Transformative Beginning, 52 ANTITRUST BULL. 435,
445 (2007); Einer Elhauge, Harvard, Not Chicago: Which Antitrust School Drives Recent
Supreme Court Decisions?, 3 COMPETITION POLICY INT'L 59, 59-68 (2007); George A. Hay,
The Quiet Revolution in U.S. Law, 26 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 27, 35-36 (2007); Thomas A.
Lambert, Dr. Miles is Dead. Now What?: Structuring a Rule of Reason for Evaluating
Minimum Resale Maintenance, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript
at 1-2, on file with author).
11. See Bauer, supra note 10, at 2 n.9 (collecting statements).
12. Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2736 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that the Dr. Miles per se
rule "reflects a basic antitrust assumption (that consumers often prefer lower prices to
more service)" and "embodies a basic antitrust objective (providing consumers with a free
choice about such matters)").
13. Id. at 2726.
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Only for a brief time during the Warren Court era was there a true per
se prohibition on RPM, which was based on non-core concerns that have
proved insufficient to preserve it. Since then, the Court has turned back
to the core of antitrust, both generally and in the law of distributional
restraints. In Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., perhaps the
most important case in this development, the Court in 1977 overruled a
Warren Court precedent 14 to hold that all nonprice distributional re-
straints must be evaluated under the rule of reason. 15 But the Sylvania
decision failed to overturn the Dr. Miles per se rule, even though there is
no demonstrable distinction between the economic effect of RPM and
other distributional restraints. 16 The formalistic line between Sylvania
and Dr. Miles proved to be a major source of confusion, forcing the Court
to cut back drastically on the scope of the per se rule to protect manufac-
turers' rights under Sylvania, which finally led to Leegin.
This Article has three parts. Part I will establish that the problems
presented by cartels, monopolistic mergers, and predatory exclusion are
the core of antitrust and that simple RPM and other intrabrand restraints
do not implicate these core antitrust concerns. Part II will trace the his-
tory of antitrust decisions on RPM until the current era, which began with
Sylvania, and show that Dr. Miles's overbroad per se rule was not based
on core antitrust concerns. Its property law foundation induced the
Court to modify its scope in response to competing property rights, which
created loopholes through which manufacturers could impose RPM.
These loopholes were not closed until 1964. Even then, a statutory loop-
hole allowed states to authorize RPM; this loophole was not closed until
1975. Part III will describe the Court's increasing reliance on core anti-
trust principles since Sylvania, which ultimately doomed Dr. Miles. This
part will show that by the time of Leegin, Dr. Miles's per se rule was so
inconsistent with the rest of section 1 doctrine and so eroded in its scope
that, far from being an example of unprincipled judicial activism, the
Court's decision in Leegin was a textbook example of the law working
itself clear. Leegin finally limits the Sherman Act's application to distri-
butional restraints to core antitrust principles and adds needed consis-
tency to section 1 doctrine.
I. RPM AND THE CORE OF ANTITRUST
The basic antitrust laws, the Sherman,17 Clayton18 and F 1C 9 Acts,
were directed, of course, at what was then termed the "trust problem,"
14. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
15. See 433 U.S. 36, 37 (1977).
16. See infra notes 327-30 and accompanying text.
17. Ch. 647, §§ 1-8, 124-35, 26 Stat. 209, 209-10 (1890) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006)).
18. Ch. 323, §§ 1-26, 38 Stat. 730, 730-40 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S. C.
§§ 12-27 (2006)).
19. Ch. 311, §§ 1-11, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S. C. §§ 41-58
(2006)).
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which was a major domestic legal and political issue from the late 1880s
until World War I. RPM was not part of the trust problem and was
hardly mentioned in the debates over the basic antitrust statutes, nor was
it part of the Justice Department's efforts to enforce them. None of this
should be surprising. Simple RPM does not implicate core antitrust
concerns.
A. THE TRUST PROBLEM
As the term suggests, the primary concern was over the great industrial
trusts that sprang up in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries.20 The essence of the trust problem was the combination of competi-
tors to create monopoly power, accompanied (or at least thought to be)
by predatory practices used to force unwilling firms to join cartels, sell
out to larger combinations, or simply expire.2 1 Combinations came in
two forms, popularly referred to as "loose" and "tight."'22 Tight combina-
tions were the new firms created by monopolistic mergers. 23 These were
the trusts that sprang up in the 1880s and quickly dominated national
markets in key commodities. Among them were Standard Oil, American
Tobacco, the Sugar Trust, the Whiskey Trust, and many others.2 4 Loose
combinations were cartels that sought market control by collusion among
their members and exclusion of actual and potential competitors. 25
As with any contested political issue, Americans in the formative pe-
riod of antitrust differed in their opinions as to the nature and extent of
the trust problem and how to deal with it.26 More than a few, including
Justice Holmes, thought there was no real problem at all. To them, big
business, and even monopolies, were a natural consequence of technolog-
20. See generally RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 227-56 (1955) (anti-
trust movement in Progressive Era); WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN
AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST Acr 54-70 (1966) (opposition to
trusts); THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 77-78 (1984); GLENN PORTER,
THE RISE OF BIG BUSINESS, 1860-1910, at 85-101 (1973); HANS B. THORELLI, THE FED-
ERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION 108-63 (1954)
(growth of opposition to trusts. See also President Grover Cleveland's Fourth Annual
State of the Union Message, given Dec. 3, 1888, deploring the rise of "trusts, combinations,
and monopolies, while the citizen is struggling far in the rear or is trampled to death be-
neath an iron heel," quoted in Rowe, supra note 2, at 1515.
21. PHILLIP AREEDA, LOUIS KAPLOW & AARON EDLIN, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS:
PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 34-35 (6th ed. 2004) (perceived predatory exclusion); Mc-
CRAW, supra note 20, at 65-79; PORTER, supra note 20, at 54-84 (combinations); id. at 93
(perceived predatory exclusion); THORELLI, supra note 20, at 63-96.
22. THORELLI, supra note 20, at 72-85 (describing "loose" and "tight" combinations);
see also ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLU-
TION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 315-36 (1977) (formation of loose and tight combinations);
MCCRAW, supra note 20, at 95-101 (evolution of tight from loose combinations).
23. THORELLI, supra note 20, at 72.
24. Id. at 76-78.
25. Id. at 72-74.
26. See generally HOFSTADTER, supra note 20, at 131-269 (noting the often ambivalent
views toward big business in Progressive Era).
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ical and economic progress.2 7 They did not support antitrust legislation
at all.28 Another group, including Theodore Roosevelt, agreed that big
business, and even monopolies, were here to stay, but that federal regula-
tion of their business practices was necessary, mostly to prevent predation
and exploitation of workers. There was no need to dissolve or prevent
the formation of properly regulated "good trusts," although a few "bad
trusts," like Standard Oil and American Tobacco, which resisted reforma-
tion, might be dissolved.29
At the opposite end of the spectrum were those who feared what Louis
Brandeis famously termed the "curse of bigness."' 30 Theirs was a Jeffer-
sonian antipathy to big business and big government. To them, the vice at
the heart of the trust problem was the elimination of small, locally owned
businesses by consolidation and predation, 31 resulting in the loss of the
industrial and commercial equivalent of the Jeffersonian yeoman and the
concomitant loss of individual liberty, opportunity, and even democracy
itself, in a nation of clerks beholden to distant giant corporations for their
livelihood.32 Their quarrel with the trusts was more political and social
than economic, although Brandeis convinced himself that big businesses
were inherently inefficient and survived only through monopolistic exclu-
sion.33 But his real concern was the threat big business posed to workers
and small businesses.34 Small businessmen, of course, shared this view
for more pragmatic reasons, as they feared the loss of their businesses to
the trusts' apparently predatory practices, especially local price cutting.
For this group, tight combinations and their perceived predatorily exclu-
sionary practices were the primary concern.
Yet another group had concerns that more closely track modern views.
For them, the vice of the new combinations was the market power that
enabled the trusts to reduce output and dictate prices to consumers, and
even more importantly, to suppliers.35 Farmers in particular blamed the
whiskey, tobacco, and cotton bagging trusts for suppressing commodity
27. 1 THE POLLOCK-HOLMES LETTERS 141 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1941) (admiring
"the originality, the courage, the insight shown by the great masters of combinations")
(quoting Justice Holmes)).
28. Id. at 163 (stating that "the Sherman Act is a humbug based on economic igno-
rance and incompetence" (quoting Justice Holmes)).
29. HOFSTADTER, supra note 20, at 245-48; THE WRITINGS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT
84-92 (William H. Harbaugh ed., 1967).
30. See generally Louis D. BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PA-
PERS OF Louis D. BRANDEIS (Osmond K. Fraenkel ed., 1965).
31. PORTER, supra note 20, at 88-89.
32. Richard Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in THE PARA-
NOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 168, 195-97 (1965); MCCRAW,
supra note 20, at 108-09.
33. BRANDEIS, supra note 30, at 104-05, 114-21; PHILIPPA STRUM, LoUis D. BRANDEIS:
JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE 147-49; see also McCRAw, supra note 20, at 99-101 (criticizing
Justice Brandeis's view).
34. MELVIN I. UROFSKY, Louis D. BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE TRADITION 70-
71 (1981).
35. See James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in
Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis, 1880-1918, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 257, 286 (1989).
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prices on what they sold.36 Others worried about monopoly pricing. But
many in this group also appreciated the obvious efficiency, reflected in
lower prices, that big business firms were able to achieve. 37 Typical of
this group were John Sherman,38 Woodrow Wilson,39 and William How-
ard Taft,40 all three of whom understood that even large combinations
were necessary to continue the unprecedented wealth created by the in-
dustrial revolution in America but believed a line could be drawn be-
tween combinations in aid of production and those seeking monopoly
power. Like Wilson, they were "for big business" but "against the
trusts."4
1
While we cannot know what proportion of the public subscribed to
these different views on the trust problem, 42 we do know that the first
group, the one that saw no problem at all, was outnumbered. All the
other groups supported at least parts of the core of antitrust, and this
support produced the statutes of 1890 and 1914.43 They all agreed that at
a minimum the tight combinations needed attention. 44 Even the
Roosevelt group agreed that the "bad trusts" needed curbing. For the
"curse of bigness" group, tight combinations, not loose ones, were the
heart of the problem.
For a great many other Americans, however, loose combinations were
very much a part of the trust problem. Cartelization mushroomed in this
era and its effect on prices engendered substantial political opposition. 45
Analytically, it was difficult to distinguish the harmful economic effects of
loose and tight combinations. 46 Both were formed to achieve market
control. The original trusts had evolved from cartels to enable more ef-
fective collusion.47 Both combinations, if successful, reduced output and
raised prices to purchasers while lowering them to suppliers.
Significantly, no one considered simple RPM, like that in Leegin, or
any other intrabrand distributional restraint, part of the trust problem.48
RPM seems to have been even more common in the early years of the
twentieth century, yet it was not seen as an antitrust problem unless
36. LETWIN, supra note 20, at 59; THORELLI, supra note 20, at 143-47.
37. HOFSTADTER, supra note 20 at 227-33; Hofstadter, supra note 32, at 192.
38. See THORELLI, supra note 20, at 180-86; Arthur, Farewell, supra note 4, at 286-87.
39. See THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF WOODROW WILSON 214-15 (E. David Cronon
ed., 1965); HoFTSTADTER, supra note 20, at 249-50.
40. See WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, THE ANTI-TRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT
129-33 (1914).
41. Arthur, Farewell, supra note 4, at 285 (quoting WOODROW WILSON, THE NEW
FREEDOM 109 (W. Leuchtenburg ed. 1961)).
42. THORELLI, supra note 20, at 108 ("After the elapse of 60-80 years there is no way
to measure accurately or conclusively 'public opinion' on [the trust problem].").
43. May, supra note 35, at 288.
44. Id. at 293-95.
45. Id. at 286.
46. THORELLI, supra note 20, at 72-73.
47. CHANDLER, supra note 22, at 315-36; MCCRAW, supra note 20, at 65-74.
48. Joseph E. Fortenberry, A History of the Antitrust Law of Vertical Practices, 11 REs.
L. & ECON. 133, 146 (1988) (noting that RPM received little attention prior to 1890); id. at
209 n.161 (noting that RPM was not condemned in the Sherman Act debates).
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foisted on manufacturers by dealer cartels. 49
B. THE RESULTING ANTITRUST STATUTES
The fifty-first Congress included the core of antitrust in the Sherman
Act. There is much debate over the ultimate "goals" of this Congress and
the one that enacted the Clayton and FTC Acts twenty-four years later.5 0
This is not surprising, as Congressmen reflected the varying views of the
public at large. 51 But there is less room, much less, for debate over what
these Congresses actually did, regardless of what individual Congressmen
may have said in the debates, 52 especially in view of the political purposes
behind legislators' public statements. 53 Procuring agreement on the goal
(or goals) to guide judges as they create national microeconomic policy
has been a hopeless task. The key to understanding the Sherman Act is
to treat it as a statute, using the traditional tools of statutory
construction. 54
Many commentators, joined by the Supreme Court after the 1940s,
have assumed that the Sherman and Clayton Acts merely delegated to
the federal courts the power to cure any perceived competitive ill-re-
gardless of its connection to the original problem of cartels, monopolistic
mergers, and predatory exclusion-guided by some vague goal such as
economic efficiency, consumer welfare, or fairness. 55 But these construc-
tions of the Act provide no useful standard for decision and have proved
inadequate to produce coherent and settled law. 56 Worse, they impose
no limit on judicial lawmaking discretion, permitting the federal courts to
49. Fortenberry, supra note 48, at 147 (RPM "flourishing at the turn of the century
and in the decade thereafter"); see infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text (only Justice
Department cases against RPM involved cartels).
50. Compare Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9
J.L. & ECON. 7, 7 (1966) (concluding that the sole goal was economic efficiency) with Fox,
supra note 3, at 1146-55 (identifying multiple goals, such as distrust of power and interests
of consumers, small businesses, and entrepreneurs; efficiency was not one of these goals,
although "[slome measure of productive and allocative efficiency is a by-prod-
uct")(emphasis added)) with Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Pri-
mary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65,
81-142 (1982) (finding that cartel/monopoly overcharges were the primary concern, but
also there were goals of protecting small business and curbing social and political power of
trusts).
51. ANDREW I. GAVIL, AN ANTITRUST ANTHOLOGY 35-36 (1996); Arthur, Farewell,
supra note 4, at 273.
52. Indeed, the author of the most comprehensive study of the Sherman Act has ob-
served that "[n]ot much time was wasted in Congress on the display of the merits of com-
petition. For purposes of legislation it was more important to get a clear picture of the evil
to be remedied." And that evil "probably was not more dimly conceived than in many
other instances in which legislation has since become imperative." THORELLI, supra note
20, at 227.
53. Less cynically, as several students of the debates have suggested, see, for example,
May, supra note 35, at 299, it is possible that the Congressmen did not realize that, in
practice, their stated goals might be in conflict.
54. Arthur, Farewell, supra note 4, at 270-71, 273-91; Arthur, Workable, supra note 4,
at 1169-70, 1172-73.
55. Arthur, Farewell, supra note 4, at 267-70, 267 n.9 (collecting sources).
56. Id. at 322-26; Arthur, Workable, supra note 4, at 1191-1201.
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regulate any form of "imperfect" or "unfair" competition to advance the
stated goal, a power approaching that of Congress under the Commerce
Clause.
57
At a minimum, the scope of the basic antitrust Acts should be con-
strued the in light of the statutory text, the evil to be addressed, and the
concrete solutions that the sponsors of the legislation stated that the pro-
posed legislation would provide. Construing the Acts this way reveals the
original core of antitrust. As demonstrated above, the evil to which the
Acts were addressed was the trust problem. 58 Congress responded with
the Sherman, Clayton, and FFC Acts, which define the core of antitrust.
1. The Sherman Act
The first and most important antitrust statute reflected the views of all
but the group that saw no real trust problem at all. But only the views of
the group epitomized by Sherman, Wilson, and Taft were fully imple-
mented. The 1890 Congress made the following decisions. First, despite
concerns for labor unions and farmers, they banned cartels, the loose
combinations that sought to control markets through collusion and boy-
cotts. 59 Second, they also banned monopolistic mergers, the tight combi-
nations that sought monopoly through consolidation and predation.60
Third, they forbade monopoly achieved through predation, even if no
combination was involved. 61 At the same time, they did not forbid combi-
nations "in aid of production," which clearly included even large mergers
short of monopoly and productive cooperation among loose combina-
tions of competitors. 62 It was also made clear that section 2's prohibitions
did not extend to single firms that achieved monopoly power by superior
efficiency. 63
57. Arthur, Farewell, supra note 4, at 327-28.
58. A careful study of the legislative history of the Sherman Act, which also focuses on
the evil addressed rather than amorphous "goals," defines the evil as "cartelization," de-
fined as "agreements among competitors that possess market power, formed with the in-
tent or that have the necessary tendency to restrict the output of the cartel members."
Nolan Ezra Clark, Antitrust Comes Full Circle: The Return to the Cartelization Standard,
38 VAND. L. REV. 1125, 1130 (1985). This includes both tight and loose combinations, and
predatory practices are also included as means toward successful reduction of market out-
put. Id. at 1135-36. This analysis is consistent with this Article's view of the core of
antitrust.
59. Id. at 1141-42; Arthur, Farewell, supra note 4, at 289; Bork, supra note 50, at 21-25,
31.
60. Arthur, Farewell, supra note 4, at 285-87; Bork, supra note 50, at 25-26; Clark,
supra note 58, at 1142-45.
61. Arthur, Farewell, supra note 4, at 288; Bork, supra note 50, at 25; Clark, supra note
58, at 1145-46.
62. See Arthur, Farewell, supra note 4, at 287; Bork, supra note 50, at 26-28; Clark,
supra note 58, at 1142.
63. Arthur, Farewell, supra note 4, at 288; Bork, supra note 50, at 28-31. Thorelli con-
cludes that "[b]ills and debates present a kaleidoscopic picture of definitions of trusts, mo-
nopolies and combinations in restraint of trade .... The aim of Congress, to rid commerce
of monopolies and restraints of trade, was explicitly set forth in the Sherman Act. It had
been set forth in substantially the same terms in numerous bills and a multitude of
speeches." THORELLI, supra note 20, at 227.
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No decisions were made with respect to RPM. No Senator even men-
tioned it. The only reference to RPM came from two Representatives,
one of whom favored RPM. The other's position is hard to ascertain, but
the best interpretation is that he "was not opposed to resale price mainte-
nance as such but only opposed to predatory practices, including preda-
tory practices of which resale price maintenance was a component." 64
Spokesmen for the statute in both houses stated that section 1, the
heart of the new statute, would incorporate common law doctrines in its
prohibition of "contracts, combinations in the form of trust or otherwise,
and conspiracies in restraint of trade. '65 They cited specific cases embod-
ying their view of what this common law forbade: cartels, monopolistic
mergers, and predatory practices.66 No case involving RPM or any other
distributional restraint was mentioned, which is not surprising inasmuch
as RPM agreements were generally upheld at common law.67
Finally, the new Act required the courts to draw the specific lines be-
tween cartels and productive loose combinations, monopolistic and be-
nign mergers, and predatory and efficient exclusion. This was a
substantial delegation to the federal courts, but not an unlimited one,
which would be especially surprising in a statute imposing criminal and
treble, or punitive, damages sanctions.68 The version of the common law
cited in the legislative debates may have been "artificial, '69 but it never-
theless was intended to70 and did provide the materials from which the
Supreme Court over the next half century constructed a body of doctrine
reasonably faithful to the 1890 Congress's policy choices, 71 except for the
misstep in Dr. Miles.
2. The Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts
The 1914 statutes were a reaction to the vague rule of reason standard
the Supreme Court announced in 1911 in Standard Oil, which seemed to
give judges too much discretion to rule in favor of the trusts.72 Their
64. Fortenberry, supra note 48, at 209 n.161.
65. Arthur, Farewell, supra note 4, at 279-80; see 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). Much ink has
been spilt debating what that common law was, especially whether it permitted "reasona-
ble" cartels or really provided doctrinal support for productive cooperation. Arthur, Fare-
well, supra note 4, at 280; see, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN
LAW: 1836-1937, at 268-95 (1991). That debate is beyond the scope of this Article.
66. Arthur, Farewell, supra note 4, at 288 n.l15 (monopolistic merger cases cited by
Sherman); id. at 289 n.123 (cartel cases cited by Sherman); Bork, supra note 50, at 25 n.54
(predation cases cited by Sherman).
67. HOVENKAMP, supra note 65, at 341; Fortenberry, supra note 48, at 208 n.155.
68. Arthur, Farewell, supra note 4, at 289-91.
69. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 20
(1978).
70. As Thorelli concluded, it "seems futile and superfluous to discuss whether the
Sherman Act was intended to bring the body of common law on the subject within reach of
the United States courts. Authors questioning that this was the intent of Congress manifest
a striking lack of familiarity with the records of legislative proceedings." THORELLI, supra
note 20, at 228,
71. Arthur, Workable, supra note 4, at 1172-73 & n.37 (collecting cases).
72. See generally LETWIN, supra note 20, at 253-78; McCRAw, supra note 20, at 114-27.
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passage was a significant part of President Wilson's New Freedom legisla-
tive program, outlined in his 1912 presidential campaign. The trust prob-
lem was, along with the tariff and banking reform, the leading domestic
issue in 1912's three-way contest among Roosevelt, Wilson, and Taft. 73
The new statutes are further evidence of what that era regarded as the
trust problem.
Significantly, the new Clayton Act, designed to prohibit specific an-
ticompetitive practices in terms,74 was limited to the ways that business
combinations supposedly gained monopoly power: local price cutting, 75
exclusive dealing and tying,76 horizontal mergers, 77 and interlocking di-
rectorates among competitors. 78 Nothing in the statute dealt with RPM
or any other intrabrand distributional restraint.
The Federal Trade Commission (FFC) Act dealt with no specific prac-
tice. It created a new regulatory commission authorized to issue cease
and desist orders against "unfair methods of competition. ' 79 While this
conceivably could include RPM, the concern was for methods of competi-
tion that resulted in monopoly, not distributional restraints. As explained
by the House and Senate conference committee's report: it "is now gen-
erally recognized that the only effective means of establishing and main-
taining monopoly ... is the use of unfair competition. The most certain
way to stop monopoly at the threshold is to prevent unfair
competition." 80
3. Government Enforcement of the New Antitrust Statutes
Government enforcement of the Sherman Act in its infancy also con-
firms the understanding that the legislation was limited to cartels, monop-
olistic mergers, and predatory exclusion. In the formative era of antitrust
73. Id. at 109-12; R. HOFTSTADTER, supra note 20, at 248-52.
74. LETWIN, supra note 20, at 271-72 (President Wilson's message to Congress); id. at
273-76 (Congressional action on specific provisions).
75. See Clayton Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2006).
76. See Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2006).
77. See Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006). This section was amended in 1950 to
extend its coverage to asset acquisitions, which had been used to evade the statute's cover-
age, to unsplit an infinitive, and to cover vertical and conglomerate acquisitions. The
amendments did not alter the " may ... substantially . . . lessen competition, or tend to
create a monopoly" substantive standard for judging acquisitions. See Celler-Kefauver
Act, ch. 1184, §§ 7, 11, 64 Stat. 1125, 1125-28 (1950) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18
(2006)). The Warren Court relied on the legislative history of the Amendments to invali-
date mergers that posed no threat of monopoly or even oligopoly, relying on a mixture of
oligopoly theory and populism. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 316-17
(1962). See Rowe, supra note 2, at 1524-33. There is no question that the sentiments in
opposition to "rising concentration" and favoring the preservation of small businesses cited
in Brown Shoe can be found in the Congressional Record. Whether these sentiments
should be used to form the meaning of a statute passed thirty-six years earlier is debatable
in view of the 1950 Congress's failure to amend the 1914 Congress's substantive standard.
This question is beyond the scope of this Article, inasmuch as Clayton Act section 7 applies
only to mergers and acquisitions.
78. Clayton Act § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 19 (2006).
79. FTC Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
80. LETWIN, supra note 20, at 277.
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(1890-1914) every one of the Justice Department's civil and criminal anti-
trust cases involved either loose or tight combinations. 8' The loose com-
bination cases attacked price fixing, market division, and boycotts against
competitors of cartel members. The other cases attacked many of the
tight combinations. Some challenged larger mergers, while others like
the cases against Standard Oil and American Tobacco, also cited their
exclusionary practices as illegal. 82
Even after the decision in Dr. Miles, the Department brought no RPM
case until it secured an indictment against Colgate on December 18, 1917,
asserting that its RPM program was a violation of the Act.83 The Gov-
ernment did bring a case against a dealer cartel which had either per-
suaded or coerced manufacturers into enforcing it by an elaborate system
of RPM.84 Significantly, the consent decree entered in this case, while
enjoining the manufacturers from employing this system in aid of the
dealer cartel, expressly exempted their use of simple RPM,85 the same
result that Leegin requires today.86 Thus, until six years after the Su-
preme Court held in a private case that RPM violated the Act, the Justice
Department had no enforcement program against it. At the same time,
the Roosevelt, Taft and Wilson Administrations were noted for antitrust
enforcement. The clear implication is that RPM was not considered by
these Administrations to be part of the trust problem.
C. THE ECONOMICS OF RPM AND THE CORE OF ANTITRUST
That RPM was not considered part of the trust problem and was almost
entirely absent from the Congressional deliberations of 1890 and 1914
should be no surprise. Except when used as part of a cartel, RPM does
not tend to produce market power by either exclusion or collusion. Its
only possible contribution to a manufacturer's market power is to provide
a more effective means for marketing its brand.
81. Commerce Clearing House's "Blue Book" lists every Justice Department action
under the Sherman and Clayton Acts. This section relies on the 1952 edition, CCH, THE
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS WITH SUMMARY OF CASES INSTITUTED BY THE UNITED
STATES, 1890-1951, at 67-115 (1952), listing all cases brought from the passage of the Sher-
man Act until the indictment in United States v. Colgate, the 195th case brought.
82. CCH, supra note 81, at 67-115.
83. CCH, supra note 81, at 115 (Case No. 195, United States v. Colgate & Co., Crimi-
nal No. 1294 (E.D.Va. indictment filed Dec. 18, 1917)).
84. CCH, supra note 81, at 75 (Case No. 32, United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Retail
Druggists, Equity No. 10593 (D. Ind. petition filed May 9, 1906)).
85. Fortenberry, supra note 48, at 148, 212 n.90. There are also allegations of RPM in
the case brought against the Whiskey Trust, one of the first actions ever brought by the
Department. CCH, supra note 81, at 68 (Case No. 5, United States v. Greenhut, Criminal
Nos. 461, 570 (D. Mass. indictments returned Feb. 23, 1892, May 10, 1892)). The key
charge was that the trust had acquired or leased seventy-eight competing distilleries which
produced seventy-five percent of all spirits sold nationally. Id. As part of the scheme to
monopolize, it sold to dealers under exclusive contracts which also included RPM. Id. It is
not clear what role the RPM played in the scheme, but it is clear that this was not a case
brought against the use of simple RPM.
86. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2715-16 (2007).
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1. The Three Basic Types of Distribution
If the world were actually like the perfect competition model of the
textbooks, all manufacturers would simply leave product distribution to
the market. No one, either manufacturer or dealer, would ever promote
a product. In a world of perfect information and standardized products
(widgets!), consumers would already know all they needed to know.
Marketing would not exist. 87 But in the real world of imperfect informa-
tion, differentiated products and strategic behavior, 88 a manufacturer
must search for the most effective way to market and distribute its
products.
Basically, there are three ways: unrestricted distribution, self-distribu-
tion, or restricted distribution through dealers.89 A manufacturer opting
for unrestricted distribution sells its product, typically a commodity, to
anyone who wishes to buy it.90 By contrast, a vertically integrated, self-
distributing manufacturer sells only to end-users. 91 If it sells consumer
products, it may use company stores, catalogs or a website to serve cus-
tomers. These manufacturers may see a need for point of sales marketing
efforts and services. For example, it may be necessary to afford consum-
ers opportunities to "test drive" or at least examine the product. Large
inventories of some products are necessary for products like furniture,
appliances and automobiles, where product lines are large and customers
value product variety: different models, colors, styles, etc. Some consum-
ers may need information about complicated products. For example,
think about the varieties of motor vehicles or, even better, new large
screen digital and high-definition televisions. Many customers will not
buy these products without information from salespersons about the dif-
ferences among models, what each can and cannot do, what you get for a
more costly model, what extra features are used for, whether a particular
customer will really use them, and so on. Customers will also need assur-
ance about warranties, parts, and service. Company outlets are one way a
manufacturer can provide necessary information and services.
87. See Thomas C. Arthur, The Costly Quest for Perfect Competition: Kodak and Non-
structural Market Power, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 10 (1994). This is the basic insight of
Coase's classic 1937 article. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386
(1937), reprinted in R. H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW, at 33 (1988).
See also Alan J. Meese, Intrabrand Competition and the Theory of the Firm, 83 N.C. L.
REV. 5, 38-61 (2004) (explaining the differences between traditional and Coasian view of
firms and vertical integration).
88. For a comparison of the textbook model of perfect competition with competition
in the real world, see Arthur, supra note 87, at 7-12.
89. Thomas C. Arthur, "Formalistic Line Drawing": Exclusion of Unauthorized Ser-
vicers from Single Brand Aftermarkets Under Kodak and Sylvania, 24 J. CORP. L. 603, 630-
32 (1999).
90. In the artificial world of perfect competition, all distribution would be unrestricted,
for other market participants would provide every service that a manufacturer or customer
might need. In the real world of transaction costs and imperfect information, however,
manufacturers and consumers of complex products cannot always depend on other market
participants for these services. See id.
91. Id. at 631.
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Another way to do this is restricted distribution, where the manufac-
turer shares the task of distribution and promotion with selected distribu-
tors who agree to perform the same tasks that would otherwise be done
in a company owned outlet: maintain inventories, provide sales and re-
pair services, and the like.92 In a word, they agree to distributional re-
straints which contractually limit their autonomy. 93 In return they get to
carry the product; others do not.
The choice among modes of distribution turns on the manufacturer's
judgment about the most effective and least costly means of marketing its
product. Self-distributing manufacturers believe that complete vertical in-
tegration into distribution is the least costly or most effective way to mar-
ket branded products. Sellers of commodities, on the other hand, usually
employ unrestricted distribution. Some manufacturers employ restricted
distribution to obtain in-store marketing when company-owned outlets
are impractical94 or to obtain the advantages of independently owned
outlets, whose owners may be more effective and motivated marketers
than the manufacturer's employees would be.95
2. Restricted Distribution
The three basic modes of distribution are on a spectrum from complete
vertical integration into distribution to none at all, with restricted distri-
bution in between. 96 Restricted distribution is a form of partial integra-
tion by contract, in which a manufacturer and its dealers become partners
in the marketing and distribution of the product.97 The degree of partial
integration can vary widely, depending on the manufacturer's perceived
needs.98 Some products (for example, autos, tires, and gasoline) are sold
through authorized dealers who sell only that manufacturer's products
and are to buyers indistinguishable from company outlets. Others are
sold by dealers who carry many products, perhaps even competing brands
of the same product
Similarly, the degree of intrabrand competition reduced by various dis-
tributional restraints also varies. Some, the so-called "airtight" restraints
on territories and classes of customers, may eliminate all competition
among dealers. 99 Airtight restrictions end all competition among dealers;
each is a "monopolist" of that brand, enabled to sell to consumers on a
92. Id. at 631; Meese, supra note 87, at 55-57.
93. Meese, supra note 87, at 23.
94. For example, it is not practical to have single-brand outlets for products that must
be widely available, such as toiletries, soft drinks, or over the counter drugs.
95. See Meese, supra note 87, at 54-55 (costs of complete integration); id. at 56-57 (use
of integration by contract to avoid these costs); see also OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING
157-58 (auto manufactures' decision to use franchised dealers rather than company
outlets).
96. Arthur, supra note 89, at 631-32.
97. Meese, supra note 87, at 55-61.
98. Arthur, supra note 89, at 625.
99. See Robert Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical
Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4 n.10 (1978) ("'Airtight' territorial or customer alloca-
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"take it or leave it" basis. The contracts between soft drink companies
and their bottlers are a good example. 100 Other restraints may leave con-
siderable room for intrabrand competition. Location clauses, which re-
strict dealers to retail sales from specified outlets, may permit a lot of
competition among dealers of the same brand if the authorized locations
are not too far apart.10' As the Supreme Court correctly stated in Sylva-
nia, these distinctions among distributional restraints are merely differ-
ences of degree and form, just like the distinction between self-
distribution (complete vertical integration) and restricted distribution
(partial vertical integration by contract). Manufacturers choose among
forms of restricted distribution in the same "most bang for the buck" way
that they choose among the three basic methods. 10 2
Restricted distribution in all its forms increases dealer margins to in-
duce them to carry and promote the brand. Often this is necessary to
prevent free riding by discounters who provide few of the necessary sales
efforts, but take sales from authorized dealers that do when consumers
take advantage of the authorized dealer's services and later purchase the
product from the discounter.10 3 But preventing free riding is not the only
reason to ensure that authorized dealers have higher margins. A dealer's
margin is like a salesperson's commission. For the manufacturer, it is part
of the cost of distribution. 10 4 For the store, it is compensation for carry-
ing and promoting that manufacturer's product rather than others'.10 5
Retailer time, effort, and shelf space are scarce resources, and stores must
choose among products to carry. Other things being equal, they carry the
products that will make them the most money: those with the best combi-
nation of sales volume and product markup. 10 6 Manufacturers may have
to ensure higher margins to attract dealers to devote shelf and floor
space, sales efforts, and the benefits of their reputations for carrying qual-
tion simply means that these restrictions are absolute, so that the dealer has exclusive
rights with respect to that supplier's product or service in the designated area of sale.").
100. See, e.g., Tomac, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 418 F. Supp. 359, 359-61 (C.D. Cal. 1976)
(describing Coca-Cola's restrictions on bottlers).
101. See Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 42-43 (1977). Location clauses
permit a manufacturer to vary the degree of intrabrand competition based on its judgment
of local conditions. It may give a very successful dealer the functional equivalent of an
exclusive territory by franchising no other stores in that locality. On the other hand, it may
authorize more, and nearby, locations in a locality where the existing dealer has been un-
successful. This is what sparked the dispute between Continental TV and Sylvania. Dis-
satisfied with Continental's results in San Francisco, Sylvania authorized another San
Francisco retailer to sell its televisions from a location less than a mile from Continental's
outlet. Id. at 39. At the same time, Sylvania refused to authorize Continental to carry its
products in Sacramento, where it had achieved exceptional results. Id. at 39-40.
102. See id. at 58 n.29; see Arthur, supra note 89, at 631.
103. BORK, supra note 69, at 290-91; RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 172-73 (2d
ed. 2001).
104. POSNER, supra note 103, at 171.
105. Victor P. Goldberg, The Free Rider Problem, Imperfect Pricing, and the Economics
of Retailing Services, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 736, 739-40 (1984).
106. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETI-
TION AND ITS PRACTICE 460 (3d ed. 2005).
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ity products to products, 10 7 even if no free riding is involved, 10 8 just as it
might have to pay higher commission rates to its own sales people in a
company outlet. Even if no in-store services are necessary, a manufac-
turer may need to ensure some level of dealer margin to induce stores to
carry the product at all. This is especially likely if the product is new and
unknown, 10 9 or one that must be available in myriad outlets. 110
The most important thing to understand about these higher dealer mar-
gins is their function: to provide dealers incentives to carry the product,
to promote it, to agree to provide necessary services, above all, to do
whatever it takes to make sales. With the appropriate incentive, manu-
facturer and dealer interests in moving the product are aligned, making it
unnecessary to enforce contractual obligations to perform services."' In
some cases, dealers may know better than manufacturers how to sell the
product. In that case there may be few requirements imposed on the
dealer, since the margin induces it to use its superior expertise to sell the
goods."l 2
The dealer efforts induced by higher margins may in turn allow the
manufacturer to spend less on advertising and marketing, which leads to
a lower wholesale price and, perhaps, even a lower retail price, despite
the higher dealer margins. It is important to remember that the manufac-
turer has no interest in spending more on marketing than necessary to
maximize sales. After all, it does not share in the dealer's higher markup;
its revenues are the product of its total sales times its wholesale price.
Dealer margins are a just another cost of distribution, which the manufac-
turer wishes to minimize. 113 The manufacturer is indifferent as to
whether it incurs these costs directly or indirectly via higher dealer mark-
ups. For this reason, the interests of consumers and manufacturers are
also aligned. Both want the lowest feasible retail price.
The key point is that the manufacturer's choice among modes of distri-
bution, including restricted distribution, cannot threaten the core of anti-
trust. It bears repeating that the distinction between vertical integration
and partial integration in distribution is only a matter of form and degree,
as are the distinctions among the various forms of restricted distribution.
The competitive impact of all forms of integration into wholesaling and
107. See Howard P. Marvel & Stephen McCafferty, Resale Price Maintenance and
Quality Certification, 15 RAND J. ECON. 346, 348 (1984).
108. HOVENKAMP, supra note 106, at 459-62; Goldberg, supra note 105, at 740-41.
109. 8 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 183-96 (2d ed.
2004) (restricted distribution generally); id. at 308 (RPM). Marvel & McCafferty, supra
note 107, at 349. Both opinions in Leegin recognized the use of restricted distribution,
including RPM, to ease the market entry of new products. Leegin Creative Leather Prods.,
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2716 (2007) (majority opinion); id. at 27-28 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
110. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 109, at 307.
111. Benjamin Klein & Kevin Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement
Mechanisms, 31 J.L. & ECON. 265, 266-67 (1988).
112. Id. at 294.
113. POSNER, supra note 103, at 171.
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retailing is the same. 114 A completely vertically-integrated, self-distribut-
ing manufacturer "fixes" its retail prices, keeps its products from dis-
counting retailers, and permits no intrabrand competition.11 5 Yet no one
has ever suggested that its unilateral pricing decisions should be subject
to antitrust challenge, despite the total absence of intrabrand competi-
tion.1 16 Clearly, its decision to self-distribute produces no artificial mar-
ket power. Its evident purpose is to obtain the most efficient distribution
of the product and to compete more effectively with other brands.
Restricted distribution also provides the manufacturer no artificial
market power. Competition from other brands remains unchanged.1 17
The manufacturer's partial integration with its distributors is intended to
achieve the most efficient product distribution. Indeed, unless airtight
restrictions are used, partial integration permits some, and often a lot of,
intrabrand competition. If self-distribution poses no threat to the core of
antitrust, a fortiori no form of restricted distribution does either.
3. RPM: Another Form of Restricted Distribution
RPM is another form of restricted distribution,11 8 whether used alone
or in conjunction with other distributional restraints. The facts in Leegin
are an example of a manufacturer's use of RPM as part of a marketing
strategy that relies on in-store service.11 9 Leegin produces the Brighton
brand of belts, handbags, and other fashion accessories for women, which
it sells nationally in over 5,000 stores, mostly small independent bouti-
ques and specialty stores.' 20 Leegin's marketing strategy relies on the
promotional activities of these smaller outlets, believing that they "treat
customers better, provide customers more services, and make [custom-
ers'] shopping experience more satisfactory than do larger, more imper-
sonal retailers.' 121 Per its president, Leegin "want[s] the consumers to
get a different experience than they get in Sam's Club or in Wal-Mart.
And you can't get that kind of experience or support or customer service
from a store like Wal-Mart.' 122 In 1997, Leegin instituted an RPM pol-
icy, refusing to sell to retailers who failed to observe Leegin's suggested
retail prices, in order to induce in-store promotion and also out of con-
114. Meese, supra note 87, at 61-69.
115. Id. at 61-64 & n.288.
116. See, e.g., Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2715.
117. See id.
118. Posner, supra note 2, at 7-9.
119. Leegin also illustrates how RPM cases arise from dealer terminations. Plaintiff
PSKS, Inc. operates Kay's Kloset, a women's apparel outlet which carries goods from
about seventy-five different makers. It began carrying and promoting Brighton's products
in 1995 and ultimately those accounted for forty to fifty percent of its profits. Leegin Crea-
tive Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2711 (2007). In December 2002,
Leegin discovered that Kay's was discounting the entire Brighton line by twenty percent
and asked it to cease. Id. When Kay's refused, Leegin stopped selling to the store, costing
it considerable revenues. Id. PSKS sued, relying on Dr. Miles. Id. at 2712.
120. Id. at 2710.
121. Id. at 2710-11.
122. Id. at 2711.
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cern that discounting harmed Brighton's brand image and reputation for
quality.123
Of the modes of restricted distribution, RPM by itself embodies only a
small degree of vertical integration. 124 Nevertheless, it still is a form of
partial integration by contract in which the dealer gives up some of its
discretion and acts at the direction of the manufacturer, as the employees
in a company store do. In return, the dealer gets a higher markup on the
product, which induces it to carry and promote it and, if necessary, en-
sures that discounters can't free ride on its marketing efforts.125 Where
products must be sold in many outlets, RPM may be the only practical
form of restricted distribution. 126
While RPM restricts intrabrand competition to a substantial extent,
there are more restrictive distributional restraints. Some manufacturers
impose "airtight" territorial and customer restrictions on dealers.
127
Others employ location clauses to achieve the same result by spacing au-
thorized dealers farther apart. 28 RPM by itself prohibits no form of non-
price competition by dealers. 29 They remain free to vie for business by
providing better service, more pleasant stores, nicer sales people and the
like.
In short, the competitive effects of simple RPM are no different from
those of other forms of restricted distribution, which in turn do not differ
from those of full vertical integration into retailing. So RPM, like the
other forms of restricted distribution, does not implicate the core of
antitrust.
What, then, explains the relatively greater concern that many exhibit
over RPM and the result in Leegin? There are three primary reasons for
this extra concern. The first is the most important. The analysis so far
has been of simple RPM, like that in Leegin, which is imposed on dealers
by a manufacturer's unilateral, good faith decision that this is the most
effective way to distribute its product. This is not part of the core of
antitrust. But RPM imposed on a manufacturer coerced by the threat of
123. Id. The policy made an exception for poorly-selling products that the store did not
plan to reorder. Id. A year later, Leegin created a marketing strategy that provided retail-
ers additional incentives to become "Heart Stores." Id. In exchange, Heart Stores
pledged, inter alia, to observe Leegin's resale prices. Id. Kay's Kloset became a Heart
Store, but after a Leegin representative visited the store and found it "unattractive," the
parties agreed that Kay's would no longer participate in this program. Id. at 2711-12
124. On the other hand, RPM may accompany other contractual provisions that pro-
vide a great deal of partial integration by contract.
125. The higher retail price may also signal higher product quality to consumers, which
may be more important to them than lower prices. George R. Ackert, An Argument for
Exempting Prestige Goods from the Per Se Ban on Resale Price Maintenance, 73 TEX. L.
REV. 1185, 1192-93 (1995). After all, as the L'Oreal models say, "I'm worth it."
126. HOVENKAMP, supra note 106, at 460; Posner, supra note 2, at 9.
127. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text. The majority in Leegin recognized
that such restraints "reduce intrabrand competition more than vertical price restraints by
eliminating both price and service competition." Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2723.
128. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
129. Alan J. Meese, Property Rights and Intrabrand Restraints, 89 CORNELL L. REV.
553, 564 (2004).
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boycott from a cartel of dealers, or employed by manufacturers to facili-
tate a cartel,1 30 does pose the same antitrust concerns as any other form
of cartel action. 13 1 An effective anticartel program should prevent these
uses of RPM.
The second and third explanations come from those who look back to
the era of expansive antitrust from 1940-1970, in which antitrust prohibi-
tions expanded far beyond core antitrust concerns, with little regard for
costs to productive efficiency.1 32 The second explanation is a lingering
belief that the proper scope of antitrust law is not limited to its core, but
should eliminate other "competitive" harms that have no relation to the
core of antitrust, but are derived from theories of imperfect competition
that were developed decades after passage of the Sherman Act, in partic-
ular the theories of monopolistic competition, which deal with oligop-
oly133 and differentiated products.13 4 Suspicion of differentiated products
and promotion, especially brand image advertising, were seen as threats
to "workable competition," the real world approximation of the perfect
competition model and the proper goal of antitrust.135 As substitutes for
advertising, RPM and other forms of restricted distribution were viewed
askance by mid-century industrial organization economists and the Jus-
tice Department, which sought to expand the Dr. Miles rule. 136
The final explanation is another form of nostalgia for the old days of
antitrust, in this instance from the Brandeis group, whose support of
small businesses morphed in the era of the Warren Court from the old
tolerance for the defensive use of horizontal restraints by little guys to a
130. Lambert, supra note 10, at 5.
131. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 109, at 83-85; Lambert, supra note 10, at 6-9
(noting that RPM aids in the detection of secret price cuts, as resale prices are easier to
monitor and also reduces incentives to cheat on cartel price, as dealers cannot pass costs on
to consumers). Some have also theorized that RPM could be imposed on a manufacturer
by a dominant retailer as part of a strategy to exclude other retailers. Lambert, supra note
10, at 9-10. If so, this also would implicate a core antitrust concern. But while this is
theoretically possible, it is unlikely. First, do such retailers exist? Second, the ones usually
thought of as having some degree of "buying power" (but not enough to be monopsonists),
especially Wal-Mart, are discounters. If anything, they would be likely to make manufac-
turers abandon restricted distribution, not impose it. In any event whether the dominant
retailer theory poses a real world antitrust concern is beyond the scope of this Article.
132. Arthur, Workable, supra note 4, at 1188-90 & nn.127-29; Thomas C. Arthur, A
Workable Rule of Reason: A Less Ambitious Antitrust Role for the Federal Courts, 68 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 337, 350-51 (2000) [hereinafter Arthur, Rule].
133. Oligopoly theory posits that sellers in concentrated markets, where a few firms
together make most of the sales, will tend not to compete on price. As a result prices will
be "sticky," even absent collusion. See F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MAR-
KET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 199-226 (3d ed. 1990). For a brief sum-
mary and critique, see Rowe, supra note 2, at 1541-47. This theory was widely adhered to
in the middle of the twentieth century, id. at 1544-45, but has been heavily criticized since
then, with the result that modern oligopoly theory is much more nuanced, predicting oligo-
polistic interdependence only in particular circumstances. SCHERER & Ross, supra, at 277-
315.
134. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
135. PHILLIP AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES 9-12, 15-17 (1st
ed. 1967).




concern for the autonomy of the small businesses involved in restricted
distribution. The aspect of partial integration that permits manufacturers
for some purposes to direct dealers as they would their own employees,
as with RPM, is the perceived vice that offends the old Brandeisian con-
cern with a nation of clerks. Along with the economic concern with im-
perfect competition, this autonomy of dealers rationale had a large effect
on antitrust doctrine from 1940-1970, especially under the Warren
Court.1
37
The concerns behind the last two explanations may be legitimate, 138
but they are not part of the core of antitrust. The views of the Brandeis
group have certainly influenced antitrust over its history, but did not pre-
vail in 1890. The theories of imperfect competition were unknown during
the formative era of antitrust, and thus could not have been viewed as
part of the trust problem or as playing any role in the passage of the
Sherman, Clayton, or FTC Acts. 139 These contested factors cannot sup-
port a coherent and stable body of doctrine. Adding their promotion to
the already difficult task actually delegated to the federal courts by these
statutes is a recipe for disaster, as illustrated in the expansive period of
antitrust in the mid-twentieth century.140 They are the proper subject of
other regulatory regimes.
II. DR. MILES AND THE (ALMOST) PER SE PROHIBITION
OF RPM
There is a vast and very informative literature on Dr. Miles and its
progeny. Many commentators have emphasized two major but mutually
inconsistent points: that (1) Dr. Miles held RPM per se illegal, even if it
was only simple RPM, like that employed by Leegin, with no conceivable
connection to a cartel at either the dealer or manufacturer level and (2)
until the Warren Court's expansive vertical restraints cases in the 1960s,
there were two significant loopholes in the Dr. Miles rule: firms could
legally impose RPM by using their right to refuse to deal to induce tacit
and even express agreements to maintain minimum resale prices and by
consigning, rather than selling, their goods.141 Obviously, both points
cannot be true. Just as obviously, the second point is the true one. Thus,
137. This was explained by Justice White in his concurring opinion in Sylvania. Cont'l
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 66-69 (1977) (White J., concurring); see infra
note 223; see also Fox, supra note 3, at 1152 ("[F]rom the 1950s to the early 1970s, the
Court emphasized freedom of traders and competition among many players, not effi-
ciency."); id. at 1184 ("The per se rule against vertical price-fixing reflects the value that
sellers of goods should have the freedom to charge the price they see fit.").
138. This question is beyond the scope of this Article.
139. Modern merger law under the 1950 amendments to section 7 of the Clayton Act
has been used to prevent oligopoly, especially in the days of the Warren Court. See Rowe,
supra note 2, at 1523-24. No other antirust statute applies to it.
140. See, e.g., Arthur, Farewell, supra note 4, at 309-28; Arthur, Workable, supra note 4,
at 1191-1201.
141. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 103, at 176-79. A third loophole was created legisla-
tively. From 1937 to 1975, firms could go further and impose RPM through binding con-
tracts in states that adopted fair trade laws. See infra notes 224-29 and accompanying text.
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only a narrowly and formalistically defined RPM was actually illegal per
se.
142
A related point has not been emphasized in the literature. The com-
monly understood rationale for Dr. Miles, that the economic effects of
vertical and horizontal price restraints are equivalent, would also require
proscription of all significant restrictions on intrabrand competition: max-
imum resale prices, territorial and customer restrictions, and perhaps
even location clauses. All restrict intrabrand competition and affect re-
sale prices. Yet there was no serious threat to their legality until the
1950s and 1960s. 143
Not until the Warren Court decisions in the 1960s could Dr. Miles accu-
rately be said to have established a real per se rule against PRM. The real
per se rule had to wait until the 1960s, when other temporarily popular,
peripheral antitrust concerns, namely dealer autonomy and "spurious"
product differentiation, motivated the Justice Department and Supreme
Court.
A. DR. MILES AND THE (SUPPOSED) PER SE RULE AGAINST RPM
1. RPM and Patent Medicines
RPM was a response to the changes in product distribution caused by
the industrial revolution in America. In the generation after the Civil
War, the advances in communication and transportation from the inven-
tion of the telephone, telegraph, railroad, and steamship, and the rapid
improvement of postal services led to mass distribution, 144 which accom-
panied the growth of mass production begun earlier in the century. 145
Mass production and mass distribution led ultimately to big business and
the trusts. 146 Mass distribution also led to big businesses in wholesaling
and retailing, first with department stores147 and later with mail order
houses in the nineteenth century, 148 then with chain stores in the mid-
twentieth century, 149 and finally with Wal-Mart and the "big box" retail-
ers of today. The superior efficiency of these stores put immense pres-
sure on traditional wholesalers and retailers and was a substantial source
of the "loud outcry of small businessmen against big business in the Pro-
142. By contrast, tacit agreements by competitors on prices have consistently been pro-
scribed. See, e.g., United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 274-75 (1942); Interstate
Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226-27 (1939); Am. Column & Lumber Co. v.
United States, 257 U.S. 377, 399, 410-11 (1921); see also E. States Retail Lumber Dealers'
Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 612 (1914) (implied boycott).
143. Fortenberry, supra note 48, at 179.
144. CHANDLER, supra note 22, at 209-39 (rise of mass distribution).
145. Id. at 240-83.
146. Id. at 285-336.
147. Id. at 224-29.
148. Id. at 230-33,
149. Id. at 233-35.
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gressive period of American history."'150 In particular, the supporters of
Brandeis's version of antitrust viewed the new mass distributors as a
threat to American values and sought legal means to protect traditional
merchants from their competition. 151
At the same time, the new techniques of mass production, distribution,
and communication led to new branded and trademarked products which
were marketed nationally, especially in the new mass market magazines.
Patent medicines were one of the first such products.152 The key to suc-
cess in this highly competitive business lay in advertising and other modes
of successful brand promotion and in the widespread availability of the
product in myriad outlets. Low prices were of lesser importance in the
competition among the leading brands. 153
RPM was widely used by patent medicine firms, including Dr. Miles.
Their trade association even developed standard form contracts for prod-
uct distribution and otherwise assisted members in maintaining resale
prices. 154 At the same time, traditional wholesale and retail druggists pro-
moted RPM as a defense to the threat from the new price cutting mass
merchandisers. Both distributor groups formed national trade associa-
tions to force manufacturers to "impose" RPM on them and were appar-
ently very effective in doing So. 1 5 5
It is not possible to say whether the manufacturers in this era would
have adopted RPM absent this pressure from wholesalers and retailers.
But there is reason to believe that they might have, that in this case the
interests of manufacturers and traditional distributors may have con-
verged. Many manufacturers of trademarked goods believed that main-
taining retail prices was important to attract and keep dealers and to
preserve their products' reputation for quality at a fair price.156 Dr. Miles
itself developed the "direct contract" sales plan at issue in Dr. Miles157
and, as shown below, asserted in the litigation that the plan was necessary
for the effective marketing of its products, along the lines in the discus-
sion of RPM in Part I.
150. Id. at 233. See generally Richard C. Schragger, The Anti-Chain Store Movement,
Localist Ideology, and the Remnants of the Progressive Constitution, 1920-1940, 90 IOWA. L.
REV. 1011 (2005).
151. MCGRAW, supra note 20, at 101-08 (noting Brandeis's support for RPM to protect
traditional distributors).
152. Rudolph J.R. Peritz, "'Nervine" and Knavery: The Life and Times of Dr. Miles
Medical Company, in ANTITRUST STORIES 61, 64-69 (Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel A. Crane
eds., 2007).
153. Peritz, supra note 152, at 67-68.
154. Id. at 74.
155. HOVENKAMP, supra note 65, at 341-42; Fortenberry, supra note 48, at 147-48, 211
n.187; Peritz, supra note 152, at 77-80. The Justice Department sued the retail druggist
cartel and obtained a consent decree. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
156. Brandeis argued in his famous article Competition that Kills, that discount prices
"tend[] to make the public believe that either the manufacturer's or the dealer's profits are
exorbitant; or in other words, that the [product] is not worth [the usual price]." Louis D.
Brandeis, Competition that Kills, in BUSINESs-A PROFESSION 243, 254 (1933).
157. Fortenberry, supra note 48, at 211 n.187.
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2. Dr. Miles
Dr. Miles and John D. Park & Sons were repeat players in a series of
cases involving RPM. Park was a leader in the "cut rate business" who
specialized in sales to discounting retailers and appears to have been an
especially effective thorn in the sides of both manufacturers employing
RPM and trade associations that sought to impose it.158 Park sued the
National Wholesale Druggists' Association in the New York state courts
to obtain an injunction against the wholesalers' standard contract, which
included RPM provisions, a case which the New York Court of Appeals
decided four to three in the Association's favor on Brandeisian
grounds. 159 Park was also the defendant in cases brought by manufactur-
ers seeking to enjoin its interference with their RPM programs. One of
these, of course, was Dr. Miles itself, which was one of a series of similar
cases brought by the company. 16
0
The litigation and decisions in Dr. Miles have been described many
times in the literature. There is no need for another description here.
Instead, several distinct points need to be emphasized.
First, Dr. Miles was not brought as an action under the Sherman Act by
either the Justice Department or a private plaintiff.1 6 ' Dr. Miles sued to
enjoin Park's allegedly tortious interference with its wholesaler and re-
tailer contracts. 162 Its case was based on its contract and property rights
and Park's defense necessarily relied on common law property and con-
tract doctrines. Park's Sherman Act defense added little, if anything, to
its affirmative defense that Dr. Miles's contracts were unenforceable be-
cause they were in restraint of trade.1 63
Second, the property law issues in the case played a significant role in
the outcome and would be even more important in subsequent cases,
leading to the Colgate and consignment loopholes. Especially important
was whether Dr. Miles's undoubted right not to sell its medicines at all
gave it the lesser right to sell under conditions that bound all subsequent
purchasers, even ones not in privity with the company.1 64 As Edward
Levi's classic article shows, courts were more concerned for the property
rights of retailers who did not purchase directly from manufacturers. The
retailers' property right to alienate the goods they bought from wholesal-
158. Peritz, supra note 152, at 73-74, 77.
159. See generally John D. Park & Sons Co. v Nat'l Wholesale Druggists' Ass'n, 67 N.E.
136 (N.Y. 1903). This case is described in Peritz, supra note 152, at 77-80.
160. Peritz, supra note 152, at 74-84.
161. In fact, no simple RPM cases were brought by the Department prior to the indict-
ment in Colgate. See supra note 83.
162. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 394 (1911).
163. Justice Hughes assumed that the restraint of trade and Sherman Act issues were
identical. He concluded the Dr. Miles's RPM was not an ancillary restraint of trade at
common law and thus was unenforceable. Id. at 383-84.
164. Id. at 407. Another issue was whether Dr. Miles's trade secret rights gave it greater
rights to impose limitations on subsequent purchasers, as patentees and copyright holders
had been held to have. The Court held that whatever extra rights patentees may have to
control prices by subsequent vendors did not extend to makers of products manufactured
under a secret process. Id. at 401-04.
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ers tended to overshadow the manufacturer's right to select its wholesale
customers, 165 since "the restriction appears to be greater as the vendee
becomes more remote from the manufacturer."'166 The "direct contract"
plan certainly raised those concerns. Each package of the product bore
not only the manufacturer's price, but also a unique number used to trace
each one through the distribution system so that price cutting retailers
could be identified and cut off. 167 Since retail druggists purchased from
Dr. Miles's wholesalers rather than directly from the manufacturer, 168
this seemed very much like a restriction running with the chattel, and the
Court rejected Dr. Miles's property rights defense of its system on an
opposition to restraints on alienation. 169
The legality of Dr. Miles's retailer contracts was only reached once it
was clear that Dr. Miles's right to impose the "direct contract" on retail-
ers could not rest on its property rights, but only on its agreements with
the retailers.1 70 This necessarily raised the question whether those con-
tracts were unenforceable because they were unreasonably in restraint of
trade under both the common law of contracts and the Sherman Act.
Other RPM programs that restricted only direct purchasers thus could be,
and later were in Colgate, distinguished from Dr. Miles on the very prop-
erty law grounds urged by the manufacturer in Dr. Miles.
171
An additional property law question was raised by Justice Holmes in
his dissent, where he asserted that even the majority would have to bow
to the rights of a manufacturer that consigned, rather than sold, its prod-
ucts to dealers.1 72 After all, Justice Hughes's opinion for the Court had
phrased the restraint of trade question as the validity of "agreements re-
stricting the freedom of trade on the part of dealers who own what they
sell."'173 This paved the way for the consignment loophole.
Third, the fact that the case arose in the context of the wholesaler and
retailer cartels' complicity in Dr. Miles's plan may well have explained
the result. The most famous part of Justice Hughes's opinion asserted
that Dr. Miles's system only benefited its dealers and thus was the func-
tional equivalent of a dealer cartel.174 Judge Lurton, in his opinions for
the Sixth Circuit in Dr. Miles and in John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman,
a similar action brought by another patent medicine concern, had empha-
sized that the "direct contract" plans in each case completely ended all
165. Edward H. Levi, The Parke, Davis-Colgate Doctrine: The Ban on Resale Price
Maintenance, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 258, 273-77; see also id. at 274-75 ("The question whether
conditions may run with goods as a type of negative easement or whether this kind of
qualification of title is a fatal restriction on alienation is in the background of the resale
price maintenance cases.").
166. Id. at 273.
167. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 377, 381.
168. Id. at 386.
169. Id. at 404-05.
170. Id. at 405-06.
171. See infra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
172. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 409-19 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
173. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 407-08 (emphasis added).
174. Id. at 407-09.
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price competition among the hundreds of wholesalers and thousands of
retailers selling the complainants' products.1 75 In Hartman, Judge Lurton
had drawn a distinction between such an extensive system and when "a
single contract only is involved and when the action is between the con-
tracting parties for a breach."'1 76
Whether the judges had the actual cartel in mind or not, they must
have been affected by the fact that, in operation, the "direct contract"
plan had all the features of a traditional cartel among wholesalers and
retailers. It was not limited to a small set of wholesalers and retailers who
clearly had no collective market power, but involved over 400 wholesalers
and 25,000 retailers, which, per Dr. Miles's bill of complaint, amounted to
"'most of the jobbers and wholesale druggists and a majority of the retail
druggists of the country."1 77 All the participants seemed to have "col-
luded" on the retail price, even though, in fact, it was set unilaterally by
Dr. Miles, and the contract provisions forbidding sales to wholesalers and
retailers who would not agree to Dr. Miles's terms resembled a boycott
by traditional wholesalers and retailers to exclude nontraditional ri-
vals.178 The system of numbered packages designed to catch cheaters
who sold to price-cutters in violation of their contracts also had a cartel
feel. The fact that there was, in fact, a reseller cartel involved may well
have impelled the judges to the conclusion that the manufacturer's
protestations on its own interest in the resale price were pretextual. In
any event, it must have underlined the cartel-like features of Dr. Miles's
system.
But no dealer cartel was actually before the court in either case. For-
mally, both cases involved simple RPM, albeit on a grand scale affecting
most, if not all, of the non-price-cutting wholesale and retail druggists in
the nation. Dr. Miles's bill of complaint naturally did not allege that it
had been compelled to adopt the "direct contract" plan by a threatened
boycott of its products and, in fact, it may not have, despite the role of the
retail and wholesale druggists' associations with RPM in the patent
medicine trade. As its bill of complaint alleged, it had good business rea-
sons to adopt RPM: it needed to ensure dealer margins to induce them to
carry and promote its products and to preserve the brand's quality im-
age. 179 Dr. Miles, then, urged many of the contemporary justifications for
175. Id. at 407; John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24, 42-43 (6th Cir. 1907).
176. Id. at 43.
177. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 381, 400.
178. The Court consistently held that such boycotts violated section 1. See, e.g., E.
States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S, 600, 614 (1914); W.W.
Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38, 44-47 (1904).
179. Per the Supreme Court's opinion, Dr. Miles's bill of complaint alleged that "most
of its sales were made through retail druggists, and that the demand for its remedies largely
depended upon their good will and commendation, and their ability to realize a fair profit."
Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 374. Sales by price cutters
injuriously affected the reputation" and "depleted the sales" of its remedies
because "the majority of retail druggists as a rule cannot, or believe that they
cannot, realize sufficient profits ... at the cut-prices announced by the cut-
rate and department stores," and therefore are "unwilling to, and do not
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RPM. Park did not contest these; its demurrer to the bill was sustained as
a matter of law, which the Sixth Circuit affirmed based on its decision in
Hartman.180 So there was no evidence in the case either of a dealer cartel
or of Dr. Miles's claims that RPM permitted it to market its goods more
efficiently.
But Justice Hughes refused even to consider Dr. Miles's arguments.
Perhaps he believed that they were pretextual in view of the dealer cartel,
whose operations were publicly known. Perhaps he was moved by the
fact that the "direct contract" plan restricted the property rights of inde-
pendent retailers "who own what they sell.' 81 Perhaps he really be-
lieved that there was no functional distinction between RPM and price
agreements among competitors. We do not know.
What we do know is that the opinion by its terms applies even to sim-
ple RPM, as it had to in view of the record. The record provided no basis
for a dealer cartel theory, which would have provided a means for distin-
guishing simple RPM, which does not endanger core antitrust values,
from dealer cartels, which do. Justice Hughes's analogy of simple RPM
to a dealer cartel rendered this functional distinction impossible. Only
formalistic line drawing remained as a way to distinguish the case. It was
quickly employed by the Supreme Court in the construction of the Col-
gate and consignment loopholes.
3. The Colgate Loophole
The Colgate loophole was defined by the Supreme Court in four con-
fusing, formalistic line drawing opinions: Colgate (1919),182 Schrader's
Son (1920), 183 Cudahy (1921),184 and Beech-Nut (1922).185 Colgate, the
most important of the four, famously announced that absent
any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the act does not re-
strict the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in
an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent
discretion as to parties with whom he will deal; and, of course, he
may announce in advance the circumstances under which he will re-
fuse to sell,
even if the result is a tacit agreement by the buyer to maintain the seller's
retail prices. 186
keep" the medicines "in stock," or "if kept in stock, do not urge or favor
sales thereof, but endeavor to foist off some similar remedy or substitute, and
from the fact that in the public mind an article advertised or announced at
"cut" or "reduced" price from the established price suffers loss of reputation
and becomes of inferior value and demand.
220 U.S. at 374-75.
180. Id. at 383; Peritz, supra note 152, at 84-86.
181. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 407-08.
182. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
183. United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (1920).
184. Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208 (1921).
185. FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
186. Colgate, 250 U.S. at 307.
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The Court upheld the trial court's dismissal of the indictment against
Colgate because it did "not charge Colgate... with selling its products to
dealers under agreements which obligated the latter not to resell except at
prices fixed by the company. '187 In other words, the indictment failed
not because it failed to allege an agreement on RPM, as the Supreme
Court incorrectly claimed in the very next case, 188 but because it only
alleged an agreement on RPM that was enforced solely by the seller's
refusal to deal. As the district judge in Schrader's Son concluded, the dis-
tinction between this and Dr. Miles makes no normative difference. 189
The other three cases struggled to find a principled distinction between
Colgate and Dr. Miles, but failed miserably. So long as the seller is al-
lowed to announce in advance or otherwise communicate that it will not
sell to those who will not observe its resale prices, the only ground for a
principled distinction, that a unilateral refusal to deal for whatever reason
cannot satisfy the concerted action requirement of section 1, is impossi-
ble. A retailer who buys and then observes a seller's resale prices, at least
if it does so repeatedly, has tacitly agreed on resale prices. 190 And there
could be no serious claim that Colgate was a mere case of refusal to deal
with price cutters, even per an announced policy. The indictment in Col-
gate, extensively summarized in the Supreme Court's opinion, clearly al-
leged much more, including express oral agreements to maintain
Colgate's fixed prices. 191
The Court was forced to draw the line in other ways. It rejected a
clear, if formalistic, distinction when it declined, in Schrader's Son, to
draw a line between express and implied agreements, stating that the in-
dictment in Colgate had failed to assert that the defendant had "made
agreements, either express or implied," which "obligate[d] vendees to ob-
187. Id. (emphasis added). The Court could not "wholly disregard the [the trial court's]
statement that-'the retailer.., could, if he chose .... sell it at any price he saw fit,"' his
decision "'being affected only by the fact that he might by his action incur the displeasure
of the manufacturer who could refuse to make further sales to him, as he had the un-
doubted right to do."' Id. at 305-06.
188. Schrader's Son, 252 U.S. at 99-100. The Supreme Court has held to this claim. See
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984) (citing Colgate for the
proposition that a manufacturer "has a right to deal, or refuse to deal, with whomever it
likes, as long as it does so independently").
189. United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 264 F. 175, 183 (N.D. Ohio 1919), rev'd,
252 U.S. 85 (1920). Nevertheless, as a judge on an inferior court, he had to find some way
to reconcile the two, settling on the formalistic but clear distinction between written and
oral agreements. Id.
190. The district judge in Schrader's Son saw this clearly: "[t]he tacit acquiescence of
the wholesalers and retailers in the prices thus fixed is the equivalent for all practical pur-
poses of an express agreement." 264 F. at 183.
191. Specifically, the indictment charged that Colgate had maintained prices by, inter
alia, "requests to offending dealers for assurances and promises of future adherence to
prices, which were often given; uniform refusals to sell to any who failed to give the same;
sales to those who did; similar assurances and promises required of, and given by, other
dealers followed by sales to them." Colgate, 250 U.S. at 303 (emphasis added).
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serve specified resale prices. ' 192 It asserted, without explaining how, that
the difference between Dr. Miles and Colgate was that a refusal to deal
per an announced policy somehow was not "a contract or combination
which imposes any limitation on the purchaser. ' 193 There really was not
much the Court could explain. As Professor Turner wrote, "once Dr.
Miles was applied to tacit as well as expressed agreements, any tenable
line between 'agreements' and compliance with a manufacturer's stated
wishes wholly disappeared. '194
Cudahy and Beech-Nut made things worse. Cudahy expressly held that
an implied agreement on RPM could violate the Act but disapproved a
jury instruction which permitted finding such an agreement when the de-
fendant reminded its distributors of its policy "on very many different
occasions" and "the great majority of them" adhered to its fixed prices. 195
Clearly an agreement can be implied from this, but somehow such an
agreement would not be a "contract or combination forbidden by the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act. '196 The Court provided no way to distinguish
implied agreements that "obligated" a retailer to adhere to manufacturer-
fixed resale prices from those that did not. Nor did it explain how any
agreement, even in a formal, written contract, could "obligate," at least in
any legal sense, a retailer to sell at any manufacturer-set retail price after
the decision in Dr. Miles.
In Beech-Nut, the Court upheld an FTC order, despite the Commis-
sion's failure to find either an express or implied agreement on prices,
because the manufacturer used methods to "secure[ ] the co-operation of
its distributors and customers, which are quite as effectual as agreements
express or implied intended to accomplish the same purpose."'197 Yet
these especially effectual methods were similar to those used in Colgate:
an announced policy followed by assurances, policed by efforts to detect
price-cutting retailers, including reports from salesmen and other distrib-
utors and markings on containers that enabled Beech-Nut to trace goods
back to specific dealers. 198
Schrader & Son, Cudahy and Beech-Nut left the Colgate doctrine a for-
malistic mess-not just arbitrary, but uncertain. Formal written contracts
were violations, despite their unenforceability. Some implied agreements
enforced only by the refusals to deal were permitted, but ones that "obli-
192. Schrader's Son, 252 U.S. at 99 (emphasis added). The trial court's suggested dis-
tinction between written and unwritten contracts, see supra notes 189-90, was necessarily
rejected by this holding.
193. Id.
194. Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Con-
scious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 688 (1962). The Court
would have been hard pressed to adopt an express/implied distinction in view of its finding
of an implied agreement in other section 1 cases in the same period. See infra note 178.
195. Frey & Son v. Cudahy, 256 U.S. 208, 210-11 (1921).
196. Id.
197. FrC v. Beech-Nut, 257 U.S. 441, 455 (1922).
198. Tyler A. Baker, The Interconnected Problems of Doctrine and Economics in the
Section One Labyrinth: Is Sylvania a Way Out?, 67 VA. L. REV. 1456, 1477 n.79 (1981).
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gated" retailers to observe fixed prices in some unexplained non-legal
way were not. So while there clearly was a protected area where courts
would not be permitted to find an implied agreement that violated the
law, the boundaries of that area were uncertain. And particularly effec-
tive modes of inducing dealer compliance with RPM, so long as they went
beyond simple refusals to deal per announced policy,199 also might be
forbidden, even in the absence of any agreement, express or implied.
Beech-Nut concentrated "the attention of the Federal Trade Commission
and the courts on the particular enforcement measures used in resale
price agreements. '200
The concern for property rights in Dr. Miles partially explains the
Court's twists and turns in these cases. Former Justice Hughes,20 1 who
represented Colgate before the Supreme Court, stressed that no restraint
on alienation was involved, in contrast to the one disapproved of in Dr.
Miles.20 2 This refocused attention on the seller's property rights-namely
the right to select its customers. Much of the Court's line-drawing can be
understood as an effort to balance the property rights of sellers and buy-
ers. Beech-Nut and the cases explicating it in the lower courts, for exam-
ple, turned on the effectiveness of plans that, like Dr. Miles's,
"restrict[ed] the freedom of trade on the part of dealers who own what
they sell" 203 by creating a de facto restraint on their alienation of goods
purchased from a wholesaler, rather than directly from the manufac-
turer.204 In cases where the refusal to deal's main effect was on direct
purchasers, the resulting loss of pricing discretion appeared less like a
restriction that ran with the chattel. 20 5
In this balancing of rights, the Court had to permit some form of infor-
mal agreements if the right to refuse to deal was to have any real world
meaning. At least for products that must be widely available in myriad
outlets, like Dr. Miles's remedies and Colgate's soaps, it is not practical to
refuse orders with no explanation, which explains why the Court felt
compelled to add that a seller could announce in advance its criteria for
199. Beech-Nut confirmed that a trader "may withhold his goods from those who will
not sell them at the prices which he fixes for their resale" without violating the Sherman
Act. Beech-Nut, 257 U.S. at 452-53.
200. Levi, supra note 165, at 301-02; see also id. at 302-07 (describing cases).
201. Hughes resigned from the Court to run unsuccessfully as the Republican nominee
against President Wilson in 1916. He rejoined the Court in 1930 when President Hoover
appointed him to replace Chief Justice Taft. DEXTER PERKINS, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC STATESMANSHIP 50-64, 142 (1956).
202. Levi, supra note 165, at 276-77.
203. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 407-08 (1911).
204. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
205. The courts may also have been affected by the number of wholesalers and retailers
involved in cases like Beech-Nut and Dr. Miles and the methods used to enforce the sys-
tem. See Levi, supra note 165, at 299 ("Beech-Nut was much more like Dr. Miles than were
Colgate, Schrader's Son, and Cudahy"). The greater the similarity to cartel enforcement
plans, especially the "boycotting" of retailers by wholesalers who themselves did not want
to be cut off, may also explain the results, see id. at 299-301, especially in the lower court
cases under Beech-Nut. Id. at 301-07. The government argued in the Supreme Court that
Beech-Nut's system was a "virtual boycott." Id. at 300.
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choosing customers. 206 But in fact, the right to announce the policy is
inadequate for real world marketing, especially when it must be imple-
mented by salesmen, who cannot be expected to choose their words as
carefully as lawyers when responding to queries from dealers who have
been cut off or fear that they may be. So the courts allowed some room
for dealer assurances of future adherence and for reinstating dealers who
gave such assurances. When the Court in Parke, Davis restricted Colgate
to the simple refusal to deal based on pre-announced criteria, but not one
step more, the Colgate loophole was effectively closed.20 7
None of this explains, however, why the Court went to such lengths to
preserve the manufacturer's right to refuse to deal with price-cutting
dealers if it really believed that even simple RPM posed the same threat
to competition that cartels posed, the stated basis of the restraint of trade/
Sherman Act part of Dr. Miles.208 Perhaps the Court did not believe it, at
least when no longer faced with the cartel background of Dr. Miles.
Clearly some courts at the time understood the difference between RPM
imposed by a dealer cartel and that imposed by a manufacturer's unilat-
eral decision.209 In his campaign for RPM Brandeis was careful to make
this distinction, emphasizing that a manufacturer's price decision re-
mained subject to the discipline of market competition from other
brands.210 Brandeis was a member of the Court when it decided Colgate
and the other three cases.211 He surely urged these points on his brethren
and may have persuaded some. Three joined him in dissenting in Beech-
Nut. These and other justices may have felt constrained by the precedent
in Dr. Miles and were unwilling to challenge its rationale, while remaining
unwilling to follow Dr. Miles to its logical conclusion and prohibit all
means of imposing RPM.
The most basic cause of the confusion, however, is the fact that simple
RPM is not part of the core of antitrust. Hughes' equation of all RPM
206. See, e.g., Beech-Nut, 257 U.S. at 454-55.
207. See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 43 (1960).
208. See Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 407-09. In Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States,
175 U.S. 211, 228-30 (1899), the Court held that the Sherman Act's prohibition on cartels
overrode the freedom of contract rights of cartel members. See also HOVENKAMP, supra
note 65, at 294-95. This strongly suggests that the Court would not have let property rights
arguments sustain cartel-like restraints. And the Court had not hesitated to extend its
prohibition of cartel restraints to implicit agreements well before its 1919 decision in Col-
gate. E. States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 612 (1914). It
did so again in 1921, just after Cudahy and only a year before Beech-Nut. See Am. Column
& Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 399, 410-11 (1921).
209. Court decisions of the era upheld simple RPM. See Fortenberry, supra note 48, at
146, 210 n.167. The Justice Department accepted a decree that prohibited RPM in connec-
tion with the retail druggist cartel while permitting simple RPM. See supra notes 84-86 and
accompanying text.
210. Brandeis, On Maintaining Makers' Prices, supra note 156, at 126 ("Operating as an
independent manufacturer under competitive conditions, you fix the price at your peril. If
you fix it too high ... either the community won't buy it, or if it does, despite the high
prices, some other person will come in and share your prosperity.., and the price will fall
if there is no combination.")
211. President Wilson appointed Justice Brandeis to the Court in 1916. STRUM, supra
note 33, at 291-99.
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and dealer cartels is simply wrong. As long as the Court remained unwill-
ing to admit this mistake, it was compelled to pursue the formalistic line-
drawing of Colgate and its progeny. It lacked any functional rationale
upon which to draw principled distinctions, having already chosen to treat
unlike cases alike.
Alternatively, the Court could discover a new rationale for prohibiting
simple RPM, which might impel it to clear up the confusion by closing the
Colgate loophole. As described below,212 the Justice Department and
Warren Court came up with two in the 1960s, dealer autonomy and
"spurious product differentiation," and the Colgate and consignment
loopholes were closed. But as we shall see, neither rationale was part of
the core of antitrust and their pursuit imposed substantial costs to pro-
ductive efficiency, which later Courts and enforcers have proved unwill-
ing to pay.
4. The Consignment Loophole
In his Dr. Miles dissent, Justice Holmes suggested that if Dr. Miles had
consigned its products to dealers, retaining title until the ultimate retail
sale, its RPM plan "would be beyond successful attack," as no one could
deny that a property owner "was acting within his rights" when he speci-
fied a price.213 Companies promptly adopted his suggestion. Indeed, the
plaintiff in Hartman had switched to a consignment system in lieu of ap-
pealing to the Supreme Court.214 Consignment promised a solution to
both the restraint of trade and restraint on alienation objections to RPM;
neither doctrine limited a seller's unilateral right to fix its own sales
price. 215
The Supreme Court, of course, ultimately upheld the consignment
mode of effectuating RPM in General Electric,216 despite the govern-
ment's urging that, but for the economically irrelevant difference be-
tween consignment and sale, GE's system of resale price restraints on its
over 400 wholesale and 21,000 retail agents, looked and functioned ex-
actly like the Dr. Miles plan. 217 The Court was unmoved by this fact, true
though it was. Property law considerations dictated the result. Once the
Court decided that GE's contracts created a genuine agency agree-
212. See infra Part II.B.1.
213. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 411 (1911).
214. Peritz, supra note 152, at 84.
215. Id.
216. United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 486-88 (1926).
217. In fact, Dr. Miles had tried to use a consignment plan to protect its RPM scheme,
but failed to extend the consignment beyond the first sale by its wholesale agents, who sold
the goods to other wholesalers and also to retailers. Inasmuch as Park could have pur-
chased the product from a wholesaler or from a retailer who had purchased the goods from
a wholesaler as permitted by the contracts, Justice Hughes was able to evade the consign-
ment issues in Dr. Miles. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 398-99.
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ment,218 the case was over. 219 Dr. Miles was distinguished on exactly the
grounds Holmes had predicted: the economically irrelevant distinction
between sale and consignment.220 And if, as discussed above,221 a major-
ity of the justices no longer believed in the equation of RPM and a cartel
of dealers, there was no core antitrust concern to temp them to override
GE's property rights.
The consignment loophole provided a superior safe harbor for RPM.
So long as careful attention was paid to the details of the consignment
agreements, safeguarding them from challenges as shams,222 the arrange-
ments were beyond successful attack just as Holmes had predicted.
There were none of the uncertainties that afflicted the Colgate loophole.
Not surprisingly, the consignment loophole quickly became the method
of choice for getting around Dr. Miles.223
Even more than the Colgate loophole, the consignment method of im-
posing RPM demonstrates that Dr. Miles did not create a real per se pro-
hibition on RPM. The property law rationales of both cases are entirely
consistent. Dr. Miles was restricting the property rights of its purchasers;
GE was not. GE's right to set its own prices was at least as basic as the
right to select one's customers. The only difference between self-distribu-
tion and the consignment device employed by GE is one of form. The
self-distributor tells its employees what price to charge while the con-
signor instructs his agents. In both cases, the manufacturer is exercising
basic property rights.
The practical consequences of the choice of form, of course, could not
be starker: RPM was forbidden if the goods were sold to distributors but
permitted if the goods were consigned. This distinction has utterly no
economic significance, as the Justice Department urged to the Supreme
Court to no avail. As a matter of antitrust law, the distinction is wholly
formalistic. For this reason, the consignment loophole can easily be criti-
cized. But the fault lies with the Dr. Miles court, not with the court that
decided General Electric. It is hard to see how they could have decided
otherwise in view of the prominence of property reasoning in Dr. Miles
218. Gen. Elec., 272 U.S. at 481-86.
219. Id. at 488 ("The owner of an article ... is not violating the common law or the
Anti-Trust Act by seeking to dispose of his articles directly to the consumer and fixing the
price by which the agents transfer the title from him directly to such consumer.").
220. Id. at 487.
221. See supra notes 208-11 and accompanying text.
222. This could easily be done by copying GE's forms as closely as possible, as many
did. See William F. Baxter, The Viability of Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 75 CAL. L. REV.
933, 934 (1987) ("Once the Court put its blessings on the particular verbal formulation
used in General Electric, scores of firms hastened to adopt the identical wording, modified
only as absolutely necessary to adopt the contract to the marketing of pharmaceuticals or
toasters or laundry detergent rather than light bulbs.").
223. Id. ("[M]ost of the business community bypassed Dr. Miles by employing the
agency device."); E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POL-
ICY AND PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 440 (5th ed. 2003) (noting "the per-
vasive use of consignment contracts as a means to avoid the Dr. Miles proscription against
RPM").
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and Colgate and in view of the control that property law gives manufac-
turers over their own goods. With consignments, it was the manufactur-
ers, not the dealers, who "own what they sell."
More basically, formalistic distinctions were unavoidable so long as the
Court adhered to Dr. Miles's erroneous equation of simple RPM and hor-
izontal price fixing by dealers, even if, as discussed above, a majority of
the justices no longer believed it but were unwilling to acknowledge the
error and overrule Dr. Miles. There also is no economic distinction be-
tween self-distribution, which has never posed any antitrust issue, and
GE's system of consignments. Even if the Court had ignored property
law altogether and decided Colgate and General Electric consistently with
Dr. Miles, the law would still have drawn a formalistic line between com-
plete and partial vertical integration in distribution, artificially impelling
manufacturers who could self-distribute to do (so even if restricted distri-
bution was more effective), and depriving those who could not practically
distribute their goods of valuable competitive tools.
5. The Fair Trade Loophole
Not much needs to be said about the fair trade loophole here, as it was
legislatively created as an explicit exception to the Sherman Act.22 4 Con-
gress passed the Miller-Tydings Fair Trade Amendment 225 in 1937 in re-
sponse to lobbying by small merchants, especially retail druggists, seeking
protection from mass distributors, especially the new chain stores. This
statute permitted states to authorize RPM agreements but specified that,
to be exempt RPM contracts, the contracts must not facilitate horizontal
price fixing among manufacturers or dealers.22 6 Forty-six states had such
laws at one time or another. After the Supreme Court read the Miller-
Tydings Act narrowly in 1951, Congress responded with the McGuire Act
of 1952,227 which permitted states to allow manufacturers to control retail
prices more pervasively. Congress repealed the fair trade exemption in
1975,228 returning the legality of RPM exclusively to judicial interpreta-
tion of the Sherman Act.
Fair trade is significant here because it shows the weakness of the polit-
ical support for antitrust prohibition of simple RPM or for other attacks
on restricted distribution until later in the twentieth century. It also
shows the strength of the political support for RPM, even among those
who generally approved of antitrust. For both the Brandeis wing of the
antitrust movement and small businesses, who provided its natural politi-
cal constituency, RPM, and probably even dealer cartels, were a neces-
224. See generally id. at 435; ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF
MONOPOLY 254-58 (1966).
225. Ch. 690, 50 Stat. 693 (1937).
226. HAWLEY, supra note 224, at 258.
227. Ch. 745, 66 Stat. 632 (1952).
228. Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801 (1975).
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sary defense against the "curse of bigness.122 9 Fair trade is also
significant because it helped eviscerate the Dr. Miles rule for nearly forty
years, even after the Warren Court's closure of the Colgate and General
Electric loopholes, with the result that the real per se prohibition of RPM
did not become nationwide until 1975. Just two years later, the rule be-
gan the long process of erosion that culminated in Leegin.
B. THE WARREN COURT FINALLY CREATES A REAL PER SE RULE
FOR RPM
Prodded by the Department of Justice, the Supreme Court closed the
Colgate and General Electric loopholes in the 1960s, finally producing a
real per se prohibition of RPM. At the same time, it carried this rule part
of the way to its logical conclusion, declaring that some nonprice distribu-
tional restraints were also per se unlawful. Two new rationales provided
the policy justification for these developments. Neither was part of the
core of antitrust; neither proved adequate to eliminate formalistic line
drawing in the law of vertical restraints.
1. Closing the Loopholes
The Warren Court's decisions in Parke, Davis230 and Albrecht23 1 did
not completely close the Colgate loophole, but they rendered it useless as
a means of imposing RPM. Albrecht also extended the Dr. Miles rule to
maximum resale prices. 232 The basic holding of these cases is that a man-
ufacturer may select its customers, refusing to deal with those who fail to
abide by its retail prices, and it may announce its policy in advance.233
But if it "goes one inch further," as Justice Harlan put it, there is an un-
lawful "combination" in restraint of trade.234 In theory, this only nar-
rowed the Colgate loophole; in practice it closed it. In the real world of
trade, it proved impossible not to go "one inch further," especially when
salesmen are involved. This was humorously but accurately demonstrated
by an antitrust practitioner who described a hypothetical meeting be-
tween a marketing manager and his antitrust lawyer, in which the lawyer
pointed out all the pitfalls of trying to impose RPM after Parke, Davis.
The meeting closed with the marketing manager saying that "even if [the
lawyer] could train his people to follow this advice and even if he could
keep them and himself from making mistakes, putting in such a program
would turn his salesmen into lawyers, and he couldn't sell anything that
way.' 235
229. The Robinson-Patman Act, passed in 1936, was also a response to chain stores and
was supported by the same constituency. HAWLEY, supra note 224, at 249-54.
230. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 42-45 (1960).
231. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
232. Id. at 152-53.
233. Id. at 149; Parke, Davis, 362 U.S. at 46.
234. Id. at 163 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
235. Edwin A. Kilburn, Other Vertical Problems: Pricing, Refusal to Deal, Distribution,
51 ANTITRUST L.J. 173, 176-77 (1982); see also George W. Warner & Co. v. Black &
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The consignment loophole was closed in Simpson v. Union Oil Co.,2 3 6
in which the Court, almost forty years later, finally adopted the Justice
Department's losing argument in General Electric that regardless of their
validity as a matter of property law, their economic function was the same
as in Dr. Miles. Finally serious about prohibiting RPM, the Court would
no longer let form triumph over substance: "To allow Union Oil to
achieve price fixing in this vast distribution system through this 'consign-
ment' device would make legality for antitrust purposes turn on clever
draftsmanship. We refuse to let a matter so vital to a competitive system
rest on such easy manipulation. '237
2. Extending Dr. Miles to Other Vertical Restraints
The Justice Department urged the Supreme Court to extend the ap-
proach of Dr. Miles to nonprice restraints, with partial success. 238 In
United States v. Aronold, Schwinn, & Co., the Court held unlawful a bicy-
cle maker's restrictions on sale by wholesalers and retailers beyond as-
signed territories and to unauthorized distributors. 239 These "airtight"
territorial and customer restrictions eliminated all intrabrand competi-
tion. But Justice Fortas' opinion for the Court seemed to reach much
further than necessary to condemn these restraints, stating categorically
that "[i]f the manufacturer parts with dominion over his product or trans-
fers risk of loss to another, he may not reserve control over its destiny or
the conditions of its resale. '240 This expansive language appeared to dis-
allow any manufacturer restrictions upon dealers. Reinforcing this con-
clusion was the Court's modification of the district court's decree to
forbid Schwinn from selling to its distributors under any contractual pro-
vision "limiting the [distributor's] freedom as to where and to whom it
will [sell] the products. '241
Taken literally, these statements mean that restricted distribution of
any kind would be an antitrust violation-if the goods are sold to distrib-
utors. But if consignment was used, Schwinn held that the very same
restrictions were to be judged under the rule of reason, notwithstanding
Decker Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1960) ("The Supreme Court has left a narrow
channel through which a manufacturer may pass even though the facts would have to be of
such Doric simplicity as to be somewhat rare in this day of complex business enterprise.");
LAWRENCE SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 392-95 (1977).
236. 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
237. Id. at 24. Despite his dismissive reference to the defendant's "consignment de-
vice," Justice Douglas's opinion did not discuss whether the consignment was valid as a
matter of property law. Justice Douglas correctly saw that this should be irrelevant to
antitrust concerns. The opinion does leave open the status of consignments used for legiti-
mate business purposes, such as saving small dealers the costs of financing products. Id. at
21. This issue was not presented in Simpson, where it was obvious that the consignment's
only business justification was to get around Dr. Miles. See id. at 21-22.
238. The Justice Department failed to persuade the Court in its first effort. See White
Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 262-64 (1963) (reversing summary judgment
based on per se theory); see also infra notes 261-62 and accompanying text.
239. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn, & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 370-71 (1967).
240. Id. at 379
241. Id. at 378.
2009]
SMU LAW REVIEW
the Court's position in Simpson just three years earlier.2 42 Underlining
the point, the Court affirmed the district court's decision that the restric-
tions under the consignment program were reasonable restraints, empha-
sizing the district court's findings that Schwinn lacked market power in
the bicycle market and that its restrictions were reasonably necessary to
compete effectively.243
It is hard to think of a more formalistic distinction than the one
Schwinn makes between sale and consignment distribution systems. As
the Court held in Simpson, the economic effect of the transaction is what
matters for antitrust analysis.244 It is also hard to find a weaker argument
in favor of a per se rule. After conceding the utility of restricted distribu-
tion as to consignments, Justice Fortas made no argument that restraints
in the sales context were somehow less effective or more anticompetitive.
He just asserted that to permit the restraints "where the manufacturer
has parted with dominion over the goods-the usual marketing situa-
tion-would violate the ancient rule against restraints on alienation and
open the door to exclusivity of outlets and limitation of territory further
than prudence permits. '245 Why this would be imprudent is never ex-
plained, nor is the Court's reliance on property law concepts, which had
been rejected in Simpson.
3. The Bases of the New Per Se Approach-and Their Weaknesses
These opinions were part of larger overall trends in Sherman Act juris-
prudence that started in 1940 with the establishment of the modern per se
rule against cartel price fixing. From Socony in 1940 until Sylvania in
1977, the per se rules dominated antitrust while the rule of reason
withered. 246 The Supreme Court strengthened and extended the per se
rules to the other major section 1 categories.24 7 The new per se rules
were notable for their overbreadth, emphasizing the form of the restraint
rather than its economic function. The rules thus forbade both cartel re-
straints and ancillary restraints used to facilitate productive cooperation,
even by parties whose collective market share was so low as to preclude
any realistic fear that they were really colluding to achieve market
power.248 This created a per se/rule of reason dichotomy in which the
same practice that would be illegal per se would be reasonable under the
rule of reason. The "split the baby" decision in Schwinn is a classic exam-
242. Id. at 380-81.
243. Id. at 381-82.
244. See supra Part II.B.1.
245. Id. at 380.
246. See generally Arthur, Rule, supra note 132, at 349-51. In practice, a plaintiff in a
section 1 case either persuaded the court that the challenged conduct was forbidden per se
or gave up, as the rule of reason came to be viewed as little more than a "euphemism for
an endless economic inquiry resulting in a defense verdict." Id. (quoting Maxwell M.
Blecher, The Schwinn Case-An Example of a Genuine Commitment to Antitrust Law, 44
AN-rIRUST L.J. 550, 553 (1975)).
247. See generally id. at 349 n.63 (collecting cases).
248. Id. at 349-51.
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ple. Schwinn's restraints in sales transaction were per se illegal; those in
non-sales consignments were upheld under the rule of reason.2 49
This was also a time of expansion of antitrust doctrine far beyond the
core of antitrust.250 The Justice Department and Supreme Court were no
longer content to limit monopoly power gained through the traditional
modes of combination and predation, but also sought to remedy other
market imperfections.251 As a perceptive English study of American an-
titrust observed, the emphasis changed "from a negative (literally 'anti-
trust') approach," limited to preventing the creation of monopoly power
by combination and predation, "to a positive ('maintaining competition')
aim"2 52 which sought to perfect competition and, in the Warren Court
era, also to promote noneconomic values, such as the autonomy of small
business decision making.253
According to Richard Posner, who briefed and argued Schwinn for the
government,254 the Justice Department's campaign against restricted dis-
tribution was fueled by the theory of monopolistic competition, 255 which
refers to the (usually slight) pricing discretion that producers of differen-
tiated products have. This occurs because one of the basic assumptions of
perfect competition, homogenous products, no longer obtains. Differenti-
ated products, like Coke and Pepsi, are not perfect substitutes for each
other, and competition among them is not solely on price. Many, perhaps
most, economists at that time believed that product promotion, especially
advertising, was socially wasteful. It helped manufacturers artificially dif-
ferentiate their products and insulate themselves from price competition.
Many economists at that time thought that heavy advertising of products
convinced consumers that less heavily advertised and perhaps cheaper
brands were not adequate substitutes, even though of equal quality, and
thus impeded the less advertised brand's ability to compete on the actual
merits of its products.2 56
These economists also viewed the promotional activities induced by
RPM and other forms of restricted distribution as forms of advertising,
also designed to impede competition on the merits.257 For the Justice De-
partment of the 1960s, this turned the efficiency arguments in favor of
restricted distribution against it and underlay the Department's argu-
ments in Schwinn. Posner's brief "suggested that Schwinn had sought to
249. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn, & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379-81 (1967).
250. See Arthur, Workable, supra note 4, at 1189-91.
251. See id.
252. A. NEAL & D. GOYDER, ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE U.S.A. 17 (3d ed. 1985).
253. See generally Kauper, supra note 3 (noting that Warren Court antitrust decisions
emphasized preservation of economic opportunity and uncoerced, fully independent deci-
sionmaking without regard to economic cost).
254. Posner, supra note 2, at 2.
255. Id. at 3.
256. Id. at 4.
257. Id.; see id. at 4 n.14 (citing William Comanor, Vertical Territorial and Customer
Restrictions: White Motor and Its Aftermath, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1429-30 (1968), as a
"representative specimen of this thinking").
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restrict the distribution of bicycles in order to reinforce an image of supe-
rior quality that would reduce the substitutability of other bicycle brands
and thus increase Schwinn's monopoly power in the bicycle market. 258
The Warren Court decisions were also motivated by the noneconomic
value of protecting maverick dealers against large manufacturers. This
was made clear by Justice White in his concurring opinion in Sylvania,
where he explained the "reason for the distinction in Schwinn between
sale and nonsale transactions" was not based on any competitive consid-
erations, but rather on "the notion in many of our cases involving vertical
restraints that independent businessmen should have the freedom to dis-
pose of the goods they own as they see fit."'259 More broadly, the deci-
sions reflected a concern "for the autonomy of independent
businessmen. "260
The decisions were not based on the Dr. Miles equation of RPM with
cartel price fixing. In White Motor the Justice Department argued that
RPM and horizontal market division closely resembled White's territorial
and customer restrictions, 261 but the Court was unwilling to repeat the
Dr. Miles mistake of equating the economic effects of cartel and manufac-
turer-imposed restrictions, at least without further information: "We do
not know enough of the economic and business stuff out of which these
arrangements emerge to be certain. ' 262 In Schwinn, the Government
took a different tack, as discussed above,263 and the Court's decision was
not based on an analogy either to RPM or to cartel market divisions and
price fixing.264
Moreover, in his opinion for the Court in Albrecht, Justice White re-
jected Justice Harlan's argument that manufacturer-set maximum resale
prices differed materially from minimum ones. Justice Harlan in dissent
argued that manufacturers had efficiency reasons to impose maximum re-
sale prices. Thus, unlike ordinary RPM, maximum resale prices could not
be equated with price fixing by a dealer cartel.265 White answered this
objection by pointing to the distributional efficiencies manufacturers
could obtain through RPM,266 rejecting the reasoning that Hughes had
used in Dr. Miles to equate all RPM with cartel price fixing-that the
only benefit of RPM was to the dealers. The holding in Albrecht was
258. Id. at 3. Schwinn had no monopoly power in the bicycle market, of course. The
Court expressly recognized Schwinn's lack of market power in upholding Schwinn's restric-
tions where the bicycles had been consigned. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn, & Co., 388
U.S. 365, 381-82 (1967).
259. Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 66-67 (1977) (White, J.,
concurring).
260. Id. at 68.
261. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 266 (1963) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) (describing government arguments).
262. Id. at 263. The Court thus reversed a summary judgment for the Government and
remanded for a trial. Id. at 264.
263. See supra notes 254-57 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 254-60 and accompanying text.
265. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 156-59 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
266. Id. at 151 n.7 (majority opinion).
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based on something else, the same value served by the prohibition on
restraints on alienation-the freedom of traders over their own goods. 267
The new rationales for the Warren Court's approach to intrabrand re-
straints were not adequate to produce consistent, lasting doctrine. Lower
court judges and future justices did not share the Warren Court's passion
for dealer autonomy, especially as economists of the Chicago persuasion
revealed the costs of dealer autonomy in terms of business efficiency.
General respect for the antitrust laws, shared by all modern federal
judges, did not extend to this noneconomic value, which is not at the core
of antitrust,268 especially as Americans in the prolonged economic slump
of the 1970s began to worry about national productivity and
competitiveness.
Even the Warren Court was not willing to take the new autonomy prin-
ciple to its logical conclusion. We have already seen the Warren Court's
failure to extend the principle to the consignment transactions in
Schwinn,269 which also restricted the freedom of participating dealers.
Despite the broad "no restraint on alienation" language in Schwinn, Jus-
tice White's concurrence in Sylvania suggests that the Warren Court
would not have forbidden all restricted distribution in sales transac-
tions.270 Instead, it probably would have attempted to balance two in-
commensurable values: the economic value of the efficiencies from
restricted distribution and the social and political value of dealer auton-
omy, which would inevitably require the drawing of arbitrary lines.
As for the "spurious product differentiation" rationale, it too draws no
strength from core antitrust values. Product differentiation does not
threaten monopoly. No one in the formative period of antitrust thought
Dr. Miles was anything like a monopolist, even though its branded, heav-
ily advertised remedies are classic examples of differentiated products
over which the maker has some small degree of pricing discretion. Differ-
entiated products have always been considered to be in the same product
markets in antitrust cases. 271 Consumers value the choice between differ-
ent brands of the same product; some like Coke, others like Pepsi. All
like having the choice. And modern economic thinking is not so quick to
267. See id. at 152-53. See also Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 67-
68 (1977) (White, J., concurring) (asserting "concern for the freedom of the businessman to
dispose of his own goods as he sees fit" is the rationale for all vertical restraint cases from
Dr. Miles until Sylvania).
268. At most, this value is related to the Brandeis concern for small business, but is not
really a part of it. As Brandeis's own support for RPM shows, most small businessmen are
beneficiaries of RPM, not victims. As Justice Breyer argued in his Leegin dissent, dis-
counting retailers like Wal-Mart are the real beneficiaries of Dr. Miles. Leegin Creative
Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2735 (2007).
269. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
270. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 59-71.
271. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 393 (1956) ("[T]his
power that ... automobile or soft drink manufacturers have over their trademarked prod-
ucts is not the power that makes an illegal monopoly. Illegal power must be appraised in
terms of the competitive market for the product.").
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condemn advertising and promotion.272 There is no coherent way to dis-
tinguish "spurious" from genuine product differentiation,273 and thus
there is no way to build non-arbitrary antitrust law based on it.
III. THE RETURN TO THE CORE OF ANTITRUST AND THE
SLOW DEATH OF DR. MILES
Beginning with Sylvania in 1977, the Supreme Court has gradually,
sometimes in fits and starts, abandoned the expansive mode of antitrust
that reached its zenith with the Warren Court and returned antitrust law
to its core.274 The Court has eliminated or at least limited the scope of all
but one of the per se rules 275 and given real content to the rule of reason,
restoring it as a means of resolving cases, even for plaintiffs. 276 The per
se/rule of reason dichotomy is now a shadow of its former self.277 In this
process, the Court usually has been guided solely by economic evidence
of the competitive significance of challenged practices, not by concerns
for the economic autonomy or well-being of small businesses. In particu-
lar, the Court has been motivated by the classic core of antitrust con-
cerns: the need to distinguish cartel from productive restraints and
predation from exclusion due to superior efficiency. In particular, the
Court has heeded modern economic thinking that casts doubt on the eco-
nomic basis of the decisions in the expansive era from 1940 until the mid-
1970s, especially those that motivated the Justice Department's advocacy
before the Warren Court. Although this process remains unfinished, 278
the Court has eliminated many formalistic distinctions, producing a much
more coherent and functional body of doctrine 279 that is far more faithful
to the original statutes. The overruling of Dr. Miles was a logical and
272. Posner, supra note 2, at 4-5.
273. Although they share the concerns over artificially differentiated products, Profes-
sors Scherer and Ross conclude by asking "Can government agencies or courts outperform
the market in determining how much variety ... is correct? Considerable skepticism seems
warranted." F. SCHERER & Ross, supra note 133, at 611.
274. Arthur, Rule, supra note 132, at 354-59; for a similar view, see Clark, supra note 58,
at 1170-80.
275. It has restricted the per se rule against horizontal price fixing to cartel restraints.
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Colum. Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1979). The boycott rule has been
limited to predatory attempts to exclude competitors. Nw. Wholesale Stationers v. Pac.
Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 285-88 (1985). In a trio of cases the per se rule
against tie-ins has been limited to those imposed by parties with actual power over the
tying product. I11. Tool Works v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 41-42 (2006) (market power
cannot be presumed from patent or copyright); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde,
466 U.S. 2, 7, 31-32 (1984) (no power when tier has thirty percent market share); U.S. Steel
Corp. v. Fortner Enters., 429 U.S. 610, 620-21 (1977) (power cannot be inferred by unique
product unless maker has competitive advantage over rivals).
276. FTC v. Ind. Fed. of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459-64 (1986); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents
of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 116-20 (1984); Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'I Eng'rs v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978). See generally Arthur, Rule, supra note 132, at 352-53
(discussing Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. 69 (1978)).
277. Arthur, Rule, supra note 132, at 351-55.
278. See id. at 355-59 (remaining issues with scope of per se rules); id. at 359-67 (un-
resolved rule of reason issues).
279. Recent decisions of the Roberts Court continue this trend. See Gifford & Sullivan,
supra note 10, at 435 (decisions "imposing a new level of rationality, consistency, and in-
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salutary part of this process.2 80
A. SYLVANIA AND THE RETURN TO ThE CORE OF ANTITRUST FOR
VERTICAL NONPRICE RESTRAINTS
1. Sylvania
The Court reversed Schwinn in Sylvania, holding that all nonprice in-
trabrand restraints are to be judged under the rule of reason. 28 1 Unlike
White Motor and Schwinn, Sylvania did not eliminate all intrabrand com-
petition among its dealers. Instead, it used location clauses, requiring
each dealer to sell only to retail customers from specified locations, to
regulate rather precisely the degree of competition among its dealers, ad-
ding additional locations where existing dealers underperformed and pro-
tecting successful dealers from competition from nearby Sylvania
dealers. 282
The case thus presented the question whether Schwinn's expansive lan-
guage did in fact herald the end of restrictive distribution. The Ninth
Circuit, sitting en banc, read Schwinn to apply the per se rule only to
airtight restrictions, like those in Schwinn itself, that eliminated all in-
trabrand competition. 283 Although Justice White urged the Court to af-
firm on this ground,284 the Court declined to do so, overruling Schwinn
entirely and restoring the rule of reason as the standard for all nonprice
vertical intrabrand restraints. 285
The Court's reasons for rejecting Justice White's approach were partic-
ularly important, for they lead inexorably to Leegin. Justice Powell's de-
cision for the Court noted that Sylvania's location clause "was neither the
least nor the most restrictive provision that it could have used. '286 As a
matter of economics, the distinctions among such restraints were merely
"differences of degree and form. '287 Because there was no "significant
social gain from channeling transactions into one form or another," dis-
tinctions among restraints "must be based upon demonstrable economic
effect rather than as in Schwinn upon formalistic line drawing. '288 And
the majority was not interested in weighing these economic effects
deed, predictability upon antitrust law" and "develop[ing] the preexisting doctrinal core,
eliminating the inconsistencies that had arisen over time").
280. Id. at 439-45 (Leegin brought vertical restraints law "into a cohesive relation to the
rest of the antitrust corpus").
281. Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.. 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977).
282. Id. at 38. In fact, its dispute with Continental T.V. arose when Sylvania, dissatis-
fied with sales in San Francisco, authorized a competitor to sell Sylvania products from a
location just one mile from Continental, and then refused to permit Continental to sell
Sylvania televisions from its store in Sacramento, where the existing dealer's efforts had
given Sylvania a fifteen percent market share, way above its national share of five percent.
Id. at 39-40.
283. Id. at 41-42.
284. Id. at 59-66 (White, J., concurring).
285. Id. at 45-47 (declining to distinguish Schwinn); id. at 58 (overruling Schwinn).
286. Id. at 58 n.29.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 58 n.29, 59.
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against noneconomic criteria, in particular the autonomy interest inher-
ent in Schwinn's antipathy to all restraints on alienation. 289 In other
words, antitrust cases must turn exclusively on the economic effects of
restraints, for "an antitrust policy divorced from market considerations
would lack any objective benchmarks. '290
Having declined to distinguish Schwinn, the Court had to either extend
Schwinn's per se rule to Sylvania's location clauses or overrule it. The
reasoning it used to decide this question has dominated modern section 1
analysis. First, it made the startling announcement that the rule of reason
was the "prevailing standard of analysis" in section 1 cases. 291 Per se
rules were the exception, reserved for "conduct that is manifestly an-
ticompetitive. ' 292 More particularly, per se rules had to "be justified
under the demanding standards" of Northern Pacific Railway Co. v.
United States,293 which requires "a pernicious effect on competition and
lack [of] any redeeming virtue. '294 None of the prevailing overbroad per
se rules actually met this "demanding standard." Sylvania thus began the
ongoing process of cutting back on those rules and reviving the rule of
reason as an effective legal standard.
Having pledged to judge Schwinn by the Northern Pacific test and
looking only at the economic effects of restricted distribution, the Court
found the per se rule wanting.295 Core antitrust concerns drove Justice
Powell's analysis and dictated the result. Justice Powell correctly framed
the issue when he noted that the "market impact of vertical restrictions"
comes from "their potential for a simultaneous reduction of intrabrand
competition and stimulation of interbrand competition. '296 How should
an antitrust court weigh this increase in the one and decrease in the
other? In a footnote to this statement, Justice Powell revealed the an-
swer: "Interbrand competition . . . is the primary concern of antitrust
law."'297 The footnote also recognized, at least implicitly, that intrabrand
competition is just not that important to the preservation of interbrand
competition and the prevention of monopoly, since the "degree of in-
trabrand competition is wholly independent of the level of interbrand
competition confronting the manufacturer. ' 298 With this understanding
of antitrust law, Justice Powell's conclusion was inevitable.
289. Id. at 53 n.21.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 49.
292. Id. at 49-50.
293. ld. at 50 (emphasis added).
294. Id. at 50 (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1956)).
295. Id. at 58.
296. Id. at 51.
297. Id. at 51 n.19. This conclusion naturally follows from his understanding in the very
next sentence that the "extreme example of a deficiency of interbrand competition is mo-
nopoly." Id. If inefficient monopoly is the evil to be prevented by antitrust law, how
could it be otherwise?
298. Id. There might be "fierce intrabrand competition among the distributors" of a
monopolist and none among those of "a firm in a highly competitive industry." Id.
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Significantly, the Court adopted the analysis of intrabrand distribu-
tional already given in this Article, drawing it from the analysis first de-
veloped by Chicago critics of the expansive antitrust doctrines of the
1940-1970 era.2 99 Per Justice Powell, these restraints should not be per se
unlawful, because they "promote interbrand competition by allowing the
manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies in the distribution of his
products" and thus "compete more effectively against other manufactur-
ers."300 At the same time, there was little or no prospect of competitive
injury from any of these restraints, despite the fact that they reduce or
even eliminate intrabrand competition, for the reasons already stated in
Part I. First, "manufacturers have an economic interest in maintaining as
much intrabrand competition as is consistent with the efficient distribu-
tion of their products" because distributor markups are part of the "cost
of distribution. '30 1 Second, interbrand competition provides a "signifi-
cant check on the exploitation of intrabrand market power because of the
ability of consumers to substitute a different brand of the same prod-
uct."'30 2 Thus, the manufacturer's incentives were aligned with the con-
sumer's. The manufacturer had no interest in enriching its dealers at its
own expense. Other things being equal, it wanted competition among its
dealers to reduce its cost of distribution and lower retail prices, thus at-
tracting more sales.303
In sum, applying the Northern Pacific test for per se condemnation,
"there [had] been no showing ... that vertical restrictions have or are
likely to have a 'pernicious effect on competition' or that they 'lack...
any redeeming virtue." 30 4 As a result, "the per se rule stated in Schwinn
must be overruled. '30 5
Sylvania may be the most important decision in modern antitrust law.
Its influence on current doctrine, not just with regard to vertical re-
straints, is enormous. Footnote nineteen, with its famous declaration that
interbrand competition "is the primary concern of antitrust law" signaled
that the Court was returning antitrust law back to its original core.306
Even so, Justice Powell drew his own formalistic line in Sylvania when,
in a footnote, he limited his analysis to nonprice vertical restraints and
left the Dr. Miles rule intact,30 7 despite the fact, as shown in Part 1,308 that
299. Id. at 54-57
300. Id. at 54-55.
301. Id. at 56 & n.24.
302. Id. at 52 n.19.
303. In fact, Justice Powell could have made an even stronger case based on his recogni-
tion that the "degree of intrabrand competition is wholly independent of the level of in-
trabrand competition confronting the manufacturer." Id. at 51 n.19. In other words, as
stated in Part I, restricted distribution does not add to even a monopolist's market power
unless it contributes to its overall superior efficiency. Even a monopolist has no motive to
enrich its distributors at its own expense or to keep retail prices any higher than necessary.
304. Id. at 58 (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5).
305. Id.
306. Id. at 51 n.19.
307. Id. at 51 n.18.
308. See supra notes 124-35 and accompanying text.
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there is no demonstrated economic effect that would justify different
treatment. 30 9 In his concurrence, Justice White accurately predicted that
this distinction "may be as difficult to justify as that of Schwinn under the
terms of the majority's analysis" and that the "effect, if not the intention"
of Powell's opinion would "necessarily . . . call into question the firmly
established rule against price restraints."'3 10 That is exactly what
happened.
2. The Tension between Dr. Miles and Sylvania: Monsanto, Business
Electronics and Khan
The natural tension between Dr. Miles and Sylvania immediately be-
came apparent in dealer termination litigation. Terminated dealers
claimed that they had been let go for noncompliance with RPM. Defen-
dant manufacturers claimed that the dealers had been terminated for fail-
ure to live up to their contractual obligations, which imposed only
nonprice restraints. Inasmuch as the economic effects of price and non-
price restraints are the same, circumstantial evidence could support both
sides' stories. It was easy for a manufacturer using only nonprice re-
straints to be found liable for using RPM.311 This problem was a direct
result of the formalistic line that had been drawn in Sylvania between
RPM and all other intrabrand restraints.312
Again writing for the Court, Justice Powell admitted this in Monsanto
Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.313 He started by highlighting "two impor-
tant distinctions" at the heart of every dealer termination antitrust case:
the first between Dr. Miles and Colgate and the second between Dr. Miles
309. Justice Powell based this distinction on two factors. First, he cited Justice Bren-
nan's bald assertion in White Motor that "[r]esale price maintenance is not only designed
to, but almost invariably does in fact, reduce price competition not only among sellers of
the affected product, but quite as much between that product and competing brands." Syl-
vania, 433 U.S. at 51 n.18 (quoting White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 268
(1963) (Brennan, J., concurring)) (emphasis added). This could only be true if RPM is used
to effectuate a manufacturer cartel. Justice Powell also cited a statement by Richard Pos-
ner that "Industry-wide resale price maintenance might facilitate cartelizing." Id. (quoting
Richard Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court, 75 COL. L. REV. 282, 294 (1975)
(emphasis added)). Posner's qualified statement is true, but hardly justifies the complete
prohibition of simple RPM. As Posner himself pointed out shortly after Sylvania "that
[RPM] might sometimes be used to bolster a manufacturer cartel cannot justify per se
prohibition under the Northern Pacific test, which requires a "pernicious effect on competi-
tion" and a lack of "any redeeming virtue." Posner, supra note 2, at 8 (emphasis added).
Second, Powell claimed that by ending the exemption for fair trade in 1975, see supra note
228 and accompanying text, Congress had "expressed its approval of a per se analysis" of
RPM. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 41 n.19. Justice Powell did not explain why the views of Con-
gress in 1975 on the correct reading of a statute passed by a wholly different Congress in
1914 should be binding.
310. See generally id. at 70 (White, J., concurring).
311. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Vertical Restrictions and Monopoly Power, 64
B.U. L. REV. 521, 521-22 (1984) (discussing that Monsanto probably used only nonprice
restraints, despite Supreme Court holding against it); Wesley J. Liebeler, 1983 Economic
Review of Antitrust Developments: The Distinction Between Price and Nonprice Restraints,
31 UCLA L. REV. 384 (1983).
312. See Liebeler, supra note 311, at 389.
313. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
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and Sylvania.314 Justice Powell then admitted that these distinctions were
largely artificial and "difficult to apply in practice" because "the eco-
nomic effect of all the conduct described above-unilateral and con-
certed vertical price-setting, agreements on price and nonprice
restrictions-is in many, but not all, cases similar or identical .... And
judged from a distance, the conduct of the parties in the various situations
can be indistinguishable. '315 Justice Powell correctly pointed out that dis-
cussions about resale prices did not necessarily indicate a lack of indepen-
dent action. As quasi-partners in the distribution of the manufacturer's
products, both sides had "legitimate reasons to exchange information
about the prices and reception of their products in the market. '316 And a
manufacturer imposing "often costly nonprice restrictions" had "the most
interest in distributors' resale prices. '317 It would "want to ensure that its
distributors earn sufficient profit to pay for" dealer services and would
"want to see that 'free-riders' do not interfere. Thus, the manufacturer's
strongly felt concern about resale prices does not necessarily mean that it
has done more than the Colgate doctrine allows. '318
The logical implication was that the distinctions cited by Justice Powell
were formalistic and the problem could be solved by treating like conduct
alike-by overruling either Colgate and Sylvania or Dr. Miles. Instead,
the Court revivified Colgate by inventing a heightened evidentiary stan-
dard for finding an agreement on resale prices. Evidence of a manufac-
turer's termination of a price-cutting dealer after complaints from a
competing dealer was now made inadequate, as a matter of law, to sup-
port an inference of RPM, 319 despite the fact that it otherwise would suf-
fice as substantial evidence in support a jury finding of RPM. This
heightened standard was necessary to avoid the "considerable danger
that the doctrines enunciated in Sylvania and Colgate will be seriously
eroded." 320
Reviving Colgate was not enough to protect manufacturers' rights
under Sylvania to use restricted distribution. In Business Electronics
Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., there was no question that defendant
manufacturer, in response to a dealer's ultimatum, had terminated plain-
tiff dealer's rival because of its deep discounting, although the favored
dealer and the manufacturer had not agreed on any particular resale price
314. Id. at 760-61. Justice Powell reiterated the right of a manufacturer to "announce its
resale prices in advance and refuse to deal with those who fail to comply. And a distributor
is free to acquiesce in the manufacturer's demand in order to avoid termination." Id. This
was still deemed "independent" action and outside the agreement requirement for section
1 liability. Id.
315. Id. at 762.
316. Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 763-64 ("[T]o assure an efficient distribution
system, manufacturers and distributors constantly must coordinate their activities to assure
that their product will reach the consumer persuasively and efficiently." (emphasis
added)).
317. Id. at 762-63 (citation omitted).
318. Id. at 762-63.
319. Id. at 763-64.
320. Id. at 763.
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and the favored manufacturer had on occasion sold below suggested re-
tail prices. 321 Nonetheless, as Justice Stevens argued in his dissent, "an
agreement to terminate a dealer because of its price cutting is most cer-
tainly not a 'nonprice restraint.' 322 Yet Justice Scalia's opinion for the
Court held that this restraint was not per se illegal under Dr. Miles.323
The Dr. Miles rule was limited to agreements on specific resale prices or
price levels.324 Agreements that otherwise had the purpose and effect of
raising resale prices were not covered by the per se rule, even an agree-
ment to terminate the only other local dealer, like the agreement in Busi-
ness Electronics itself, leaving the favored dealer with an exclusive
territory free of intrabrand competition. 325 Contrast this with the broad
definition of per se illegal-cartel price fixing in Socony: any collusive
scheme for "raising, depressing fixing, pegging, or stabilizing" prices.326
The Court's reasoning assumes that simple RPM is not part of the core
of antitrust. Justice Scalia first reiterated at some length the rationale
behind Sylvania,327 emphasizing the "real potential" of distributor restric-
tions to "stimulate interbrand competition, 'the primary concern of anti-
trust law,"' and the adequacy of interbrand competition to "'provide a
significant check' on any attempt to exploit intrabrand market
power."328 He then stated the Court's basic framework for deciding dis-
tributional restraints cases, "guided by the premises" of Sylvania and
Monsanto, which incorporate the inherent primacy of interbrand over in-
trabrand competition:
[T]hat there is a presumption in favor of a rule-of-reason standard;
that departure from the standard must be justified by demonstrable
economic effect ... rather than formalistic distinctions; that inter-
brand competition is the primary concern of the antitrust laws; and
that rules in this area should be formulated with a view towards pro-
tecting the doctrine of GTE Sylvania.329
The restricted definition of RPM subject to the Dr. Miles rule was nec-
essary to protect Sylvania. Juries could not be trusted to distinguish be-
tween legitimate and illegitimate dealer terminations. "In the vast
majority of cases," Scalia reasoned, "it will be extremely difficult for the
manufacturer to convince a jury that its motivation was to ensure ade-
quate services, since price-cutting and some measure of service cutting
321. 485 U.S. 717, 721 (1988).
322. Id. at 736 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
323. Id. at 735-36.
324. Id.
325. The plaintiff had been terminated at the request of the only other Sharp dealer in
Houston. Id. at 721.
326. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940); see also id. at
221 ("[Any combination that tampers with price structures") (emphasis added); id. at 222
("Nor is it important that the prices.., were not fixed in the sense that they were uniform
and inflexible. Price-fixing ... has no such limited meaning.").
327. Bus. Elecs., 485 U.S. at 724-27.
328. Id. at 724-25 (quoting Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36. 52 n.19
(1977)).
329. Id. at 726.
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usually go hand it hand. '330 To avoid liability, "[m]anufacturers would be
likely to forgo legitimate and competitively useful conduct rather than
risk treble damages. '331 That higher prices might result made no differ-
ence, for "vertical nonprice restraints only accomplish the benefits identi-
fied in GTE Sylvania because they reduce intrabrand price competition
to the point where the dealer's profit margin permits provision of the
desired services. '332
Most importantly, the new restricted definition of illegal RPM was ex-
plicitly limited to RPM that might be used to facilitate a cartel: "[t]here
has been no showing here that an agreement between a manufacturer and
a dealer to terminate a 'price cutter,' without a further agreement on the
price or price levels to be charged by the remaining dealer" could facili-
tate cartelizing, because absent such an agreement "the manufacturer
both retains its incentive to cheat on any manufacturer-level cartel (since
lower prices can still be passed on to consumers) and cannot as easily be
used to organize and hold together a retailer-level cartel. ' 333 Even the
complete loss of intrabrand competition, as in Business Electronics, is ap-
parently of no concern to antitrust.334
In State Oil Co. v. Kahn, the Court in 1997 unanimously overruled Al-
brecht's per se prohibition on manufacturer-imposed maximum resale
prices.335 The Court once again relied upon the premises of Sylvania,
particularly the "general view that the primary purpose of the antitrust
laws is to protect interbrand competition. '336 The Court's decisions since
Sylvania had made it clear that maximum RPM could not injure inter-
brand competition. 337 Significantly, Justice O'Connor reiterated the gen-
eral economic analysis of restricted distribution, especially the natural
incentive of manufacturers to strive for the best mix of marketing services
and dealer margins, which aligns manufacturers' interests with consum-
ers' interests.338 She noted that Albrecht had really been grounded on a
concern for "dealer freedom, ' 339 rather than any concern for core anti-
trust values.340 As in Sylvania itself, dealer autonomy was no longer an
330. Id. at 727-28.
331. Id. at 728.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 726-27 (footnote omitted).
334. Dissenting, Justices Stevens and White clearly saw this: "What is most troubling
about the majority's opinion is its failure to attach any weight to the value of interbrand
competition." Id. at 748 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
335. 522 U.S. 3, 21-22 (1997).
336. Id. at 15 (citing Bus. Elecs., 485 U.S. at 726).
337. Id. at 14-15.
338. Id. at 17.
339. Id. at 16.
340. A concern for dealers, of course, would be a core concern for the Brandeis "curse
of bigness" school, but not for other supporters of antitrust. See supra notes 33-36 and
accompanying text. But as observed previously, see supra note 268, the prohibition of
vertical restraints is more likely to injure dealers than to help them. O'Connor noted that
this had been the case with regard to Albrecht itself: it had "'prompted many suppliers to
integrate forward into distribution, thus eliminating the very independent trader for whom
Albrecht expressed solicitude."' State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 16-17 (1997) (quoting 8
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adequate basis for antitrust rules.
In these three decisions, the Supreme Court was confronted with the
real world consequences of its failure in Sylvania to face up to the func-
tional equivalence of RPM and nonprice vertical restraints. Faced with
the choice between Sylvania and Dr. Miles, the Court in each case opted
for Sylvania and the core of antitrust. In doing so, it almost completely
dismantled the Warren Court's construction of a real per se prohibition
on manufacturer-imposed resale prices. Once again, careful manufactur-
ers could use the Colgate loophole, as in Business Electronics, to at least
inhibit sharp departures from suggested resale prices. Their ability to im-
pose "nonprice" restrictions that achieved the same economic result was
also ensured, as the lower courts have created a virtual rule of per se
legality for nonprice restraints. 341
Most importantly, the rationale for the restricted scope of the per se
rule in Business Electronics- that RPM is of antitrust significance only if
used to facilitate cartelization-also supports doing away with the per se
approach altogether under the Northern Pacific test. Most uses of RPM,
like that at issue in Leegin, obviously have nothing to do with any cartel
and thus cannot have a "pernicious effect on competition," at least not on
interbrand competition, the only kind at the core of antitrust.342
Dr. Miles was now in critical condition, perhaps even on life support.
With no support from core antitrust concerns, nor from any concern for
dealer autonomy or hostility to marketing, it was no longer a viable part
of antitrust law. All it could do was produce formalistic distinctions and
traps for the unwary. The time had come for it to be overruled.
B. LEEGIN AND THE DEATH OF DR. MILES
Unlike Dr. Miles, Leegin squarely posed the issue whether all forms of
RPM should be absolutely prohibited, even those with no relation to a
cartel.343 There was no question that Leegin had imposed its system of
restricted distribution as part of a unilateral marketing decision, nor was
there any question that its Brighton brand of leather goods faced substan-
tial competition from other brands.344 The Supreme Court responded by
finally overruling Dr. Miles.345 The only surprise was Justice Breyer's
harsh dissent and that three other justices joined it.
PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND
THEIR APPLICATION 395 (1989)).
341. See Arthur, supra note 89, at 621-22. Some lower courts have even permitted the
use of consignments to impose RPM. See, e.g., Day v. Taylor, 400 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir.
2005).
342. The restricted per se rule in Business Electronics can only be justified on prophy-
lactic grounds. A prophylactic per se rule, while not unreasonable for restraints whose
cartelistic and benign uses cannot easily be distinguished, does not fit within the Northern
Pacific definition of a proper per se rule. In any event, it would be hard to justify a prophy-
lactic rule against even simple RPM.
343. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2712 (2007).
344. Id. at 2711.
345. Id. at 2710.
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1. The Majority Opinion
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion completed the return to the core of
antitrust for intrabrand restraints, relying on the Court's cases since Syl-
vania, both those involving other section 1 per se rules and those on re-
stricted distribution. 346 He started with the overarching principle
established in Sylvania that the "rule of reason is the accepted standard"
under section 1 and that per se rules are reserved for the limited case of
restraints that satisfy the Northern Pacific standard.347 Applying the
Northern Pacific standard to RPM, he noted that the Court's more recent
decisions had rejected the restraint on alienation and RPM/dealer cartel
equivalence rationales on which Dr. Miles had been based.348 The former
had no relevance to the economic effects of RPM 34 9 and the latter was
simply incorrect, due to the inherent economic differences between verti-
cal and horizontal restraints, as explained in Business Electronics and
Maricopa.3 50 These rationales could not support a per se rule. 351
Nor did an economic analysis of RPM support a per se rule. The eco-
nomics literature is filled with pro-competitive justifications for RPM,352
which "are similar to those for other vertical restraints. '353 The only an-
ticompetitive uses of RPM, per Justice Kennedy, were related to the core
of antitrust, primarily (1) to facilitate cartelization, as the Court had rec-
ognized in Business Electronics or, less plausibly, (2) those by a dominant
retailer or manufacturer to exclude equally efficient rivals.354 These possi-
ble uses did not satisfy the always anticompetitive/never procompetitive
standard for a per se rule: RPM agreements "can have either procompeti-
tive or anticompetitive effects, depending upon the circumstances in
which they are formed. '355 Such cases must be judged under the rule of
reason, 356and the lower courts should develop a structured rule of reason
to condemn the use of RPM in connection with illicit collusion or
exclusion. 357
Justice Kennedy also rejected claims that stare decisis required the re-
tention of the Dr. Miles rule for two basic reasons. First, stare decisis is
less significant in cases about the scope of the Sherman Act's prohibi-
346. Id. at 2721.
347. Justice Kennedy did not cite to Northern Pacific directly. But he stated the same
standard: "[r]esort to per se rules is confined to restraints . . . 'that would always or almost
always tend to restrict competition and decrease output' . . . and 'lack ... any redeeming
virtue."' Id. at 2713 (quoting Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 771, 723
(1988); Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289
(1985)) (internal quotes omitted).
348. Id. at 2714.
349. Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2714.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 2714-16.
353. Id. at 2715.
354. Id. at 2716-17.
355. Id. at 2717.
356. See id. at 2718.
357. Id. at 2720.
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tions, as the Court held in Khan.358 Second, "we have overruled our
precedents when subsequent cases have undermined their doctrinal un-
derpinnings. '359 Cases since Colgate, especially Monsanto, Business Elec-
tronics, and Khan, had so undermined and distinguished Dr. Miles that its
per se rule had become "inconsistent with a principled framework" for
deciding section 1 cases.360
2. Justice Breyer's Dissent
Justice Breyer's dissent 361 is strange for two reasons. First, it reads like
an antirust opinion of the Warren Court in its hostility to restricted distri-
bution and its preference for the old, overbroad per se rules. Justice
Breyer argued that RPM can be harmful, not for the core concerns cited
by the majority, but for imperfect competition arguments like those in the
Justice Department's brief in Schwinn.362 For example, Justice Breyer ar-
gued that RPM prevents "dealers from offering customers the lower
prices that many customers prefer" and "from responding to changes in
demand ... by cutting prices," thus encouraging them "to substitute ser-
vice, for price, competition, thereby threatening wastefully to attract too
many resources into that portion of the industry." Also RPM disfavors
discount retailers and thus inhibits the growth of "more efficient modes
of retailing. '363
While Justice Breyer grudgingly conceded that RPM might have some
procompetitive advantages, he recognized only two of the many recog-
nized in the economic literature364-facilitation of new entry and promo-
358. Id. (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997)). Significantly, all four
dissenters in Leegin joined in Khan. For similar reasons Justice Kennedy rejected the argu-
ment that Congress had mandated the per se rule when it repealed the exemption for fair
trade. Congress had only eliminated the statutory exemption for RPM under state fair
trade laws; it had not codified the per se rule, but left the matter to the Court. Id. at 2724.
359. Id. at 2721 (quoting Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 528, 443 (2000)).
360. Id. at 2722. Justice Kennedy elaborated that "it makes little economic sense when
analyzed with our other cases on vertical restraints. If we were to decide that the procom-
petitive effects of resale price maintenance were insufficient to overrule Dr. Miles, then
cases such as Colgate and GTE Sylvania themselves would be called into question." Id.
Preserving Dr. Miles would draw arbitrary lines between different ways of doing the same
thing, e.g., the ability to implement RPM under Colgate, Monsanto, and Business Electron-
ics and the use of self-distribution, both of which had the same effect as the RPM forbid-
den by Dr. Miles. See id. at 2722-23. Preserving Dr. Miles would be especially unprincipled
in view of the fact that airtight territorial restrictions, which unlike RPM eliminate all in-
trabrand competition, are subject to the rule of reason. See id. at 2723.
361. Id. at 2725 (Breyer, J., dissenting). This dissent was joined by Justices Stevens,
Souter, and Ginsburg.
362. See supra notes 271-75 and accompanying text.
363. Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2727 (Breyer, J., dissenting). As the majority pointed out,
these objections can be made against all forms of restricted distribution and even against
self-distribution. Id. at 2722-23. Justice Breyer also argued that RPM could facilitate oli-
gopoly pricing. Id. at 2727 (Breyer, J., dissenting). This is another argument based on
imperfect competition. Oligopoly pricing has never been held to be a violation of any
antitrust law, although its possibility is a factor in assessing mergers under the 1950 amend-
ments to section 7 of the Clayton Act. See Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730 (1914)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000)).
364. See supra notes 125-32 and accompanying text.
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tion of dealer services by curbing free riding-expressing his skepticism
of the free rider argument.365 He then argued for a prophylactic per se
rule based on administrative convenience, which reflected his beliefs that
(1) the balance between the procompetitive and anticompetitive uses of
RPM was a close call and (2) that courts would have undue difficulty in
distinguishing between them.366 More fundamentally, this argument im-
plicitly rejected the modern approach to per se illegality, arguing in effect
for a return to the overbroad prophylactic per se rules and the rule of
reason/per se dichotomy of the 1940-1970 antitrust era. The same argu-
ment would support overruling all Court decisions since 1977 on the ap-
propriate scope of the per se rules and the rule of reason.
What is even more striking about this laundry list of supposed virtues
and vices of RPM is its complete irrelevance to any theory of collusion at
either the manufacturer or dealer level or of predatory exclusion of any
manufacturer or dealer. Thus, most of Justice Breyer's perceived vices of
RPM are completely unrelated to the core of antitrust and to the basic
antitrust statutes. These supposed vices are arguments for
microeconomic regulation by the Court based on the old Warren Court
biases against nonprice forms of competition and in favor of "no frills"
forms of retailing based strictly on discounting. They are a throwback to
the expansive view of the antitrust law of the 1940-1970 era, which has
been rejected by the Court since the mid-1970s.
Significantly, the dissent's decidedly "old school" assessment of RPM
does not reflect prevailing economic views. Per Professor Elhauge, a cur-
rent Harvard antitrust authority, "[i]f anything was a topic of consensus
among the Harvard and Chicago schools, it was the proposition that this
rule of per se illegality was misguided. '367 The dissent's arguments for a
return to overbroad per se rules also do not reflect current Harvard views
about the proper role of per se rules and the rule of reason. 368
Second, Justice Breyer's principal argument was that stare decisis re-
quired the preservation of the per se rule, yet he ignored all of the many
other section 1 precedents that undermine the Dr. Miles rule. 369 His
main stare decisis argument was that both Congress, in repealing the ex-
emption for fair trade in 1975,370 and large, discounting retailers had re-
lied upon Dr. Miles.3 71 As for Congress, he cited persuasive evidence
that Congress in 1975 had understood that RPM was per se illegal at that
365. Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2728-30 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
366. Id.
367. Elhauge, supra note 10, at 60. Indeed, he asserts, the Leegin result, if anything,
better reflects Harvard, not Chicago antitrust views, because "unlike the Harvard school,
Chicago school scholars generally take the next step of insisting the proper rule was one of
per se legality." Id.
368. Id. at 60 (dissent's admission of both beneficial and harmful effects "is the classic
recipe for applying rule-of-reason review"); id. at 61 (dissent's arguments for a per se rule
unpersuasive).
369. Id.
370. Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2731-32 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
371. Id. at 2735.
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time.372 But that does not prove reliance, certainly not reasonable reli-
ance in view of the Court's traditional "common law" approach to anti-
trust and the notorious instability of antitrust doctrine over the years.
More importantly, as the majority correctly pointed out, the text of the
repealing legislation did not codify the per se rule. It merely rescinded
the exemption, returning RPM to the general prohibitions of section 1,
which have not been altered since 1890. In any event, Justice Breyer con-
ceded that "Congress did not prohibit this Court from reconsidering the
per se rule," 373 despite PSKS's arguments that Congress had enacted the
per se rule in the repealer.374 At most this was evidence of the 1975 Con-
gress's view of section 1. Justice Breyer never discussed why the views of
the 1975 Congress, which could have but did not prohibit RPM in terms,
should be more relevant than that of the 1890 Congress, which did actu-
ally enact the operative language of section 1.
Justice Breyer also did not support the dubious claim that discount
stores had reasonably relied on Dr. Miles, apparently to their impending
detriment. RPM was readily available nationally before the Warren
Court decisions that created the real per se rule. Even then it could be
used in fair trade states until 1975.375 As the majority pointed out, no
more than ten percent of goods were sold subject to RPM. 376 Moreover,
discount stores have thrived despite Sylvania and its progeny, which pro-
tect restricted distribution, including de facto RPM.377 Is it credible that
overruling Dr. Miles imperils discounters such as Wal-Mart, the office
superstores, the great department stores, and Amazon.com?
More importantly, this discussion ignores the Court's section 1 prece-
dents since Sylvania in 1977. Yet these precedents all deal with the same
section of the same statute. All are on point unless they can be distin-
guished on a ground that makes a normative difference. The most impor-
tant ignored precedent is Northern Pacific, whose standard for per se
illegality has shaped modern section 1 doctrine since Sylvania. Applica-
tion of the Northern Pacific standard requires reversal of Dr. Miles, even
under Justice Breyer's one-sided account of the economic effects of RPM.
He conceded that when "a producer and not a group of dealers seeks a
resale price maintenance agreement, there is a special reason to believe
some [procompetitive] benefits exist," because of the manufacturer's in-
372. Id. at 2731-32.
373. Id. at 2732.
374. Id. at 2723-24 (majority opinion) ("That the Dr. Miles rule applied to vertical price
restraints in 1975, according to respondent, shows Congress ratified the rule.").
375. See id. at 2731-32.
376. Id. at 2725. Justice Breyer countered that ten percent of current sales would be
more than $300 billion. Id. at 2735-36 (Breyer, J., dissenting). This hardly proves his point.
The remaining ninety percent available to discounting would be over $2.7 trillion, enough
to allay fears for the future of Wal-Mart et al.
377. As Justice Kennedy responded for the majority, "the narrowness of the [Dr. Miles]
rule has allowed manufacturers to set minimum resale prices in other ways. And... resale
price maintenance was legal under fair trade laws in a majority of States for a large part of
the past century up until 1975." Id. at 2724-25 (majority opinion).
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terest in the lowest resale price consistent with effective distribution.378
Thus it cannot be said that RPM lacks "any redeeming value. '379 Conse-
quently, Dr. Miles cannot stand under the Northern Pacific standard.
Why should Northern Pacific not apply in Leegin? After all, the Court
has even used it to narrow the scope of the most basic per se rule: So-
cony's ban on horizontal price restraints. 380 What is so different about
even simple RPM that it should be in a special category, deemed the most
harmful restraint in all of antitrust? Justice Breyer never explained this.
He did not even discuss the Northern Pacific standard, even while dissent-
ing from an opinion applying it. This is a strange way to honor stare
decisis.
Justice Breyer also never discussed Dr. Miles's inconsistency with Syl-
vania, Monsanto, Business Electronics, and Khan, despite the majority's
express reliance on those cases. 381 The Court's stated rationale in Mon-
santo and Business Electronics for limiting the scope of Dr. Miles was that
price and nonprice restraints do the same things and can easily be mis-
taken for each other in litigation. 382 Justice Kennedy correctly relied
upon those cases in concluding that stare decisis could not justify the con-
tinued survival of Dr. Miles.383 After Monsanto and Business Electronics,
Dr. Miles left only a trap for the less sophisticated. Overruling it not only
removes the formalistic distinction between vertical price and nonprice
restraints, as Justice Kennedy argued, but adds to the overall consistency
of section 1 doctrine. That "like case be decided alike" is the very heart
of stare decisis.384
378. Id. at 2729; see also id. at 2728 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (new entry and free riding
arguments for RPM).
379. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
380. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Colum. Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 8 (1979).
381. Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2721-23 (majority opinion). If Justice Breyer would not over-
rule those cases, he never explained why the administrative difficulties of separating an-
ticompetitive from procompetitive vertical price fixing are more difficult than those
attending the use of the rule of reason for the horizontal price restraints at issue in Broad-
cast Music and NCAA. Nor did he explain why the risk of error in vertical restraint cases is
greater and more harmful than in cases of competitor price restraints, which lie at the very
core of antitrust.
382. See supra notes 311-40 and accompanying text. The problems outlined in Mon-
santo and Business Electronics, together with those the courts wrestled with before Parke-
Davis, see supra notes 182-223 and accompanying text, also belie Justice Breyer's claims
that judicial implementation of the Dr. Miles rule, "even with the complications attend-
ant" the Colgate loophole, "has proved practical" over the years and that the "per se rule is
well-settled law." Id. at 2734-35. They also disprove Justice Breyer's claim that Sylvania's
overruling of Schwinn was based on a "need to avoid 'confusion' in the law, a factor totally
absent here." Id. at 2736-37 (emphasis added).
383. Id. at 2721.
384. The dissent does mention Khan and Sylvania in its response to the majority's argu-
ment that the Court has traditionally acted like a common law court in Sherman Act cases,
revising and overruling precedents, pointing expressly to Khan and Sylvania. Id. at 2720,
2721-22. Justice Breyer's reply emphasized that "the Court decided Sylvania only a decade
after Schwinn" and Khan "29 years after Albrecht-still a significant period, but nowhere
near close to the century Dr. Miles has stood." Id. at 2736. But as this Article has shown,
the per se rule did not have any real teeth until the Warren Court closed the Colgate and
consignment loopholes in the 1960s. Even then RPM was per se legal in fair trade states.
Just two years after the repeal of the fair trade exemption in 1975, Sylvania undercut the
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Near the end of his opinion, Justice Breyer conceded that courts could
properly overrule cases by "over time issu[ing] decisions that gradually
eroded the scope and effect of the rule in question, which might eventu-
ally lead the courts to put the rule to rest. '385 As this part has shown,
that is exactly how the Court overruled Dr. Miles.
3. The Opinions Compared
The contrast between the majority and dissenting opinions in Leegin is
stark. They reflect two very different approaches to antitrust. The major-
ity opinion is a traditional judicial approach to a difficult statute. Its re-
tention of antitrust liability under the rule of reason for the use of RPM
to facilitate a cartel, but not for its productive uses, is soundly based on
the core principles of antitrust. While the majority based its judgment on
the modem economic consensus on distributional restraints, it also relied
on the Northern Pacific standard for per se illegality and the Court's dis-
tributional restraint cases since 1977, all of which are consistent with the
statutory core of antitrust and embedded in modem antitrust doctrine. It
also based its judgment on the need for consistency in its interpretations
of section 1, an appropriate goal for all statutory-based law.
By contrast, the dissent's approach is not consistent with the views of
most modem economists, but rather with those that prevailed in the days
of the Warren Court. Nor is the dissent faithful to the statutory core of
antitrust, the prevailing Northern Pacific approach to per se liability, the
Court's distributional restraints decisions of the last three decades, or the
basic principle that like cases should be treated alike.
The point is not that the majority's view of the policy issues raised by
RPM is "correct." After all, the dissenters' view was once the view of
mainstream economists and is still shared by eminent, competent econo-
mists. The real question is how to pick between the competing theories.
Is this merely a quasi-legislative policy judgment? Or is there a more
judicial approach?
It is the thesis of this Article that there is a more judicial approach-
the use of the core of antitrust as a standard-and that the main thrust of
the Court's antitrust decisions over the last three decades, including
Leegin, are consistent with that standard. Despite the inherent necessity
to incorporate economics in their judgments, these decisions are funda-
mentally judicial, not political. The dissent, on the other hand, has no
basis in the statutory core of antitrust. If one of the opinions in Leegin is
to be fairly criticized as more like that of an agency than a court, 386 it is
the dissent.
rationale of Dr. Miles, as Justice White's concurrence and contemporary commentators
made clear. So for most of its troubled existence, Dr. Miles has hardly been the pillar of
antitrust law that the dissent suggests.
385. Id. at 2736.
386. Brunell, supra note 10, at 528-29.
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CONCLUSION
Dr. Miles's per se prohibition on even simple RPM was not based on
core antitrust values-the ones that inspired passage of the basic antitrust
statutes in 1890 and 1914. By itself, RPM does not facilitate collusion,
inefficiently exclude competitors from markets, or raise any other core
antitrust concern. Consequently, the per se rule against RPM has never
been wholeheartedly supported by the Supreme Court, except for a few
years under the Warren Court. Even then, the non-core concerns under-
lying Dr. Miles were inadequate to produce a coherent, consistent, and
stable doctrine.
As the Court in the 1970s began basing antitrust doctrine on the origi-
nal, enduring concerns that led to the original statutes, Dr. Miles's per se
rule increasingly became inconsistent with the rest of section 1 doctrine,
particularly the favorable treatment of nonprice distributional restraints,
whose economic effects are substantially similar to those of simple RPM.
Interpreting section 1 in light of its original purposes and following the
fundamental principle that like cases should be treated alike, the Court
appropriately overruled Dr. Miles. Far from betraying basic and estab-
lished antitrust principles, the Court's decision in Leegin finally based the
law of restricted distribution entirely on the core of antitrust, bringing
greater consistency, clarity, and legitimacy, to section 1 doctrine.
20091
492 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62
